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Abstract 
 
This is the first study to examine the awards made by the European 
Court of Human Rights in respect of non-pecuniary damage from an em-
pirical perspective. It uses a multiple regression analysis based on data (929 
observations) drawn from the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Docu-
mentation database. We identified three elements of the “equity principle” 
used by the Court for the calculation of awards made in respect of non-
pecuniary damage (seriousness of the violation, applicant- and overall con-
text-related factors). Our empirical results show that there is a statistically 
significant association between the amount awarded in respect of non-
pecuniary damage and the intensity of the violation, the existence of a sepa-
rate opinion, the respondent state, and the fact whether the applicant is a 
legal or a natural person. Our study therefore contradicts the view voiced in 
the literature that awards made in respect of non-pecuniary damage under 
the ECHR are “unpredictable” and “inconsistent”. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)1 allows the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (the Court; the ECtHR) to “afford just satis-
faction” to an “injured party”, besides simply finding and stating the human 
                                                        
1  Art. 41 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 4.11.1950, 213 UNTS 221, as amended by Protocol Nos. 11 and 14, 1.6.2010, ETS No. 
155. 
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rights violation (Art. 41 ECHR). “Art. 41-awards”, notably those relating 
to non-pecuniary damage suffered, are often criticized for their inconsisten-
cy, subjectivity, lack of reasoning and the resulting unpredictability. Franz 
Bydlinski finds that “the assessment practice does not seem at all consistent” 
and deplores a “lack of transparency”.2 A recent study concludes that “the 
practice in respect of compensation for moral prejudice is rather unpredict-
able.”3 Others criticize the “global-intuitive quantification of the damag-
es.”4 Dinah Shelton writes that the “European Court of Human Rights 
damage awards for non-pecuniary harm are difficult to comprehend other 
than as subjective judgments about the moral worth of the victim and the 
wrongdoer.”5 The Court has not disclosed the exact principles guiding its 
awards made in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It does not seem over-
stated to say that “just satisfaction” is the least reasoned part in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
Given this criticism and the lack of information available from the Court, 
this study examines the principles behind awards in respect of non-
pecuniary damage. This is the first study to approach this topic from an 
empirical perspective. We use a multiple regression analysis based on data 
(N=929) drawn from the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Documenta-
tion (HUDOC) database.6 
The empirical analysis of the Court’s practice sheds light on the associa-
tion between the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 
the intensity of the violation (and other factors). Our analysis thus comple-
ments the typical legal (doctrinal) analysis. The purely doctrinal analysis 
follows the binary logic of “violation” or “no violation”, and – as the find-
ing of a court – it has the merit of producing an unequivocal result. The 
clarity comes at a cost, though. The binary logic does not accommodate the 
intuition that certain violations of human rights are more severe than others, 
                                                        
2  F. Bydlinski, Methodological Approaches to the Tort Law of the ECHR, in: A. 
Fenyves/E. Karner/H. Koziol/E. Steiner (eds.), Tort Law in the Jurisprudence of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights, 2011, para. 176 (“The assessment practice of the Court with re-
gard to [...] non-pecuniary damage can be described mainly under the aspect of case-oriented 
Court discretion, albeit unfortunately mostly without any highlighting of the circumstance 
considered material in the respective case.”) See also, F. Bydlinski (note 2) paras. 177 and 187. 
3  O. Ichim, Just Satisfaction under the European Convention on Human Rights, 2015, 
121. 
4  C. Kissling/D. Kelliher, Compensation for Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Loss, in: A. 
Fenyves/E. Karner/H. Koziol/E. Steiner (note 2), 579 (584). 
5  D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed. 2005, 345. 
6  The HUDOC database is available at <http://www.echr.coe.int>, see “HUDOC Manu-
al” for a description of the HUDOC database. All Articles refer to the ECHR (if not indicat-
ed otherwise). 
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or – put differently – that they create different degrees of harm. For exam-
ple, the violation appears more severe if a person is tortured by state agents 
than if a person’s property is confiscated by the state. In contrast to the bi-
nary legal analysis, an empirical analysis allows us to capture different levels 
of injustice. 
We proceed as follows: Section II clarifies key concepts relating to awards 
of just satisfaction under the ECHR. Section III outlines the concept and 
purpose of awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage under Art. 41. For 
convenience sake, we will sometimes call those “Art. 41-awards”, leaving 
out all awards under Art. 41 which do not deal with non-pecuniary damage. 
Section IV explains how the Court uses the equity-principle for calculating 
the awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Section V proceeds with a 
description of how our HUDOC-based dataset was prepared for the empir-
ical analysis. The empirical model and the estimation results are described in 
Section VI. The results of the regression analysis are discussed in Section 
VII. Section VIII concludes. Tables and figures are presented in Appendices 
A-C. 
 
 
II. Terminology 
 
1. Just Satisfaction in Art. 41 ECHR 
 
“Just satisfaction”, the term used in the Convention, means a monetary 
payment for the damage suffered by the victim of a human rights violation. 
This study uses “harm”, “prejudice” or “grievance” as synonyms for “dam-
age” (see in detail below). The text of the Convention itself avoids the terms 
“damage” or “harm”. It only mentions the state response required after the 
state has violated a human right (and potentially caused damage thereby). 
This response is called “satisfaction” in the Convention. 
The text of Art. 41 itself seems to use “satisfaction” interchangeably with 
“reparation”: by prescribing that the Court may only award “just satisfac-
tion” “if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows 
only partial reparation to be made”. Also during the drafting process, the 
terms “satisfaction”, “reparation”, and “compensation” have all been em-
ployed seemingly without distinction.7 The Court’s Practice Directions use 
                                                        
7  The draft convention presented by the European Movement to the Committee of Minis-
ters of the Council of Europe in July 1949 foresaw that the Court could prescribe “measures 
of reparation”, (Doc. CDH(70)17, 30.4.1970, 2). This formula (“measures of reparation”) was 
taken up by various delegates in the first session of the consultative Assembly of the Council 
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the terms “financial compensation”, “monetary award” or “award in respect 
of pecuniary/non-pecuniary damage” in order to circumscribe and para-
phrase the Convention’s term “just satisfaction”.8 
“Just satisfaction” (granted in the form of money) may be afforded under 
Art. 41 in respect of three types of loss: pecuniary damage, non-pecuniary 
damage, and costs and expenses9 (Rule 6 of the Court’s Practice Directions). 
This paper examines only the second possible trigger of just satisfaction, 
non-pecuniary damage. It does not deal with the first trigger, with pecuni-
ary (i.e. financial, economic) damage. 
 
 
2. Damage and Harm 
 
Neither the Convention itself nor the Court’s case-law defines “dam-
age”.10 The ECtHR seems to use “damage” and “harm” interchangeably. 
For example, the Court’s Practice Directions use “non-material harm, for 
example mental or physical suffering”, as a synonym for “non-pecuniary 
damage”.11 For the purpose of this paper it is therefore not necessary to dis-
tinguish “damage” from “harm”. 
                                                                                                                                  
of Europe (August-September 1949), Doc. CDH(70)17, 30.4.1970, 4. The preparatory report 
of the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe mentioned in its list of questions raised 
for drawing up the draft convention the “question of the competence of the Court to pro-
nounce judgments amending [sic!] damages, restitutions in kind (restitutio in integrum) or 
moral damages (…)”. Undated report, reprinted Doc. CDH(70)17, 30.4.1970, 17. Only in the 
committee of experts, the Italian delegate, Mr. Perassi, for the first time introduced the term 
“just satisfaction” in his proposed amendment for what then became Art. 36 of the prelimi-
nary draft convention (7.2.1950). (Doc. CDH(70)17, 30.4.1970, 18 and 20). In his capacity as 
rapporteur of the legal committee, P.-H. Teitgen proposed that the Court be empowered to 
“declare the impugned legislative, executive, or judicial acts to be null and void”. (Legal 
Committee, preliminary draft, 17.8.1950), reprinted in Doc. CDH(70)17, 30.4.1970, 28. In 
that text, he preferred the term “just compensation”, and introduced it in his amending pro-
posal. But his proposal was rejected by the legal committee in favor of leaving the draft text 
(“just satisfaction”) as previously approved by the Committee of Ministers as it was. The rea-
son was to deny the Court any power of annulment concerning domestic legal acts. The ter-
minology “reparation” or “satisfaction” apparently did not play any role here. (Doc. 
CDH(70)17, 30.4.1970, 29). 
 8  European Court of Human Rights, Practice Directions: Just Satisfaction Claims 
(1.7.2014), at <http://www.echr.coe.int>, e.g. paras. 2, 13, 24. 
 9  “Costs and expenses” are those incurred by the applicant “in trying to prevent the vio-
lation from occurring, or in trying to obtain redress therefor [sic]”, e.g. court registration fees 
or costs of legal assistance, Practice Directions (note 8), para. 16. 
10  See K. Oliphant/K. Ludwichowska, Damage, in: A. Fenyves/E. Karner/H. Koziol/E. 
Steiner (note 2), 397. 
11  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 13. 
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The damage triggering the Art. 41-award may be “pecuniary” (syn. “ma-
terial”) or/and “non-pecuniary” (syn. “immaterial” or “moral”). Pecuniary 
damage is, according to the Court, the “loss actually suffered as a direct re-
sult of the alleged violation”.12 It is a damage which involves the decrease of 
the economic wealth or fortune of a person. It can therefore be calculated 
by relying on market prices. That loss may also take the form of lost profits. 
It must have been actually suffered or expected. Examples are the loss of 
property which has been taken in violation of the Convention or costs for 
medical treatment needed due to physical injury which resulted from a vio-
lation of the right to physical integrity, e.g. police violence. In response to 
such pecuniary damage, the sum of the satisfaction awarded by the Court 
will usually reflect the full calculated amount of the damage.13 According to 
the Practice Directions,  
 
“[t]he principle with regard to pecuniary damage is that the applicant should 
be placed, as far as possible, in the position in which he or she would have been 
had the violation found not taken place, in other words, restitutio in integrum”.14 
 
In the Court’s words, the “respondent State is expected to make all feasi-
ble reparation for the consequences of the violation in such a manner as to 
restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach”.15 The ap-
plicant bears the full burden of proof for any pecuniary damage alleged.16 
In contrast, non-pecuniary is damage which does not involve a diminu-
tion of the victim’s patrimony, it cannot be priced on the market. Therefore, 
the sum awarded will inevitably be conventional (i.e. governed by social 
convention) as opposed to economically “rational” (determined by demand 
and supply on a market). 
Many human rights violations directly or indirectly cause pecuniary 
damage, for example the loss of working capacity through a violation of the 
right to physical integrity. However, non-pecuniary, immaterial damage is 
the more typical harm caused by human rights violations. It is the trauma, 
anxiety, anger, etc. coming with the attack on human dignity, the loss of 
trust in state institutions, the loss of beloved persons, the mental and physi-
cal pain lasting after torture, imprisonment, censorship, separation from 
family members, and so on. Although such immaterial harm can by defini-
tion never be “remedied” by money, most legal systems or legal instru-
                                                        
12  Beshiri and Others v. Albania, App. No. 7352/03 (ECtHR 22.8.2006), para. 111. 
13  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 12. 
14  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 10. 
15  Stolyarova v. Russia, App. No. 15711/13 (ECtHR 29.1.2015), para. 75. 
16  E. Steiner, Just Satisfaction under Art. 41 ECHR: A Compromise in 1950 – Problemat-
ic Now, in: A. Fenyves/E. Karner/H. Koziol/E. Steiner (note 2), 14. 
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ments, including the ECHR, foresee the possibility to award money to per-
sons who suffered such harm. For example, the Court’s Practice Directives 
state that an award of just satisfaction may “provide financial compensation 
for non-material harm”.17 
In European tort law, “damage” and “harm” are often used interchangea-
bly as well, with “harm” being the more “natural kind” notion, and “dam-
age” being the accompanying legal term.18 In the international law of state 
responsibility, “damage” refers to “material or other loss suffered”.19 Here 
“damage” appears to be the narrower concept (coming in the form of either 
“material” or “moral” damage), while “harm” is the wider concept, encom-
passing in addition to damage all sorts of interferences with concerns or 
general interests.20 
In the ECHR-context, “damage” is any sufficiently serious harm to a le-
gal interest protected by the Convention. Indeed, the Convention rights 
shape the protection of specific human interests. For example, the right to 
fair trial (Art. 6) and the right to an effective remedy (Art. 13) both protect 
the legal interest of “procedural justice”. 
 
 
3. Reparation, Damages, and Compensation in other Areas of 
International Law 
 
In general international law, a different set of terms relates to the wrong-
doer’s response to the harm done. The first is “damages” in the plural 
(dommage-intérêt; Schadenersatz). “Damages” are a special form of “repa-
ration”. “Reparation” means correction or rectification (by the wrongdoer) 
of the harm caused. If those damages relate to immaterial harm, they are 
                                                        
17  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 13. 
18  Art. 2:101 of the Principles of European Tort Law states that “[d]amage requires … 
harm to a legally protected interest”. The commentary says that “harm to a legally protected 
interest is damage and the words are effectively synonymous”. The transnational, non-
binding Principles of European Tort Law have been drafted by a transnational network of 
academic experts on tort law, and seek to prepare the harmonization of tort law throughout 
Europe (European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law: Text and Commen-
tary, 27 et seq. [2005]). 
19  J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part, 2013, 55. 
20  See Art. 31 (Reparation) of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II,  
2001, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), 91 para. 5. 
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 2016, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
8 Altwicker-Hámori/Altwicker/Peters 
ZaöRV 76 (2016) 
mostly called “moral damages”/“dommage moral”.21 “Reparation” may be 
owed in kind or (especially if the restoration of the status quo ante is not 
possible) in form of money (then also called “compensation”).  
In the terminology of the general international law on state responsibility 
– which arguably also governs the responsibility of the States Parties to the 
Convention for violations of any of its provisions –22 the ECtHR’s award 
granting money (called “just satisfaction” in the ECHR) in respect of non-
pecuniary damage would fall under the heading of ”compensation” in the 
sense of Art. 36 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
This means that “just satisfaction” in Art. 41 seems to have a different 
meaning than the term “satisfaction” as nowadays used in the general inter-
national law of state responsibility.23 Art. 37 ILC Articles simply speaks of 
“satisfaction”, meaning, as its second paragraph states, “acknowledgement 
of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appro-
priate modality”.24 The part of an ECHR-judgment simply finding (stating) 
the human rights’ violation would have to be considered as a kind of “satis-
faction” in the ILC-sense. 
In the context of universal human rights and international humanitarian 
law, a catch-phrase is the “right to remedy and reparation”.25 In the termi-
nology of that area of the law, “reparation” is the content of a secondary 
claim arising from international (state) responsibility for a violation of in-
ternational norms on human rights. “Reparation” here mostly denotes the 
                                                        
21  See, e.g., Zullo v. Italy, App. No. 64897/01 (ECtHR 10.11.2004), para. 25: “non-
pecuniary damage, which is the anxiety, inconvenience and uncertainty caused by the viola-
tion, and other non-pecuniary loss”. 
22  The commentary on the preliminary draft convention underscored the conformity of 
the projected power of the Court to grant just satisfaction with the general rules of interna-
tional law: “This provision is in accordance with the actual international law relating to a vio-
lation of an obligation by a State. In this respect, jurisprudence of a European Court will nev-
er, therefore, introduce any new element or one contrary to existing international law.” Doc. 
CDH(70)17, 30.4.1970, 21. 
23  When the ECHR was drafted in 1950, the legal framework and legal terminology of the 
law of state responsibility was not yet fully elaborated and was not codified. 
24  International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts (note 20). 
25  UNGA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, UN Doc. A/Res/60/147 (21.3.2006). In scholarship P. de 
Greiff, The Handbook of Reparations, 2006; C. Ferstman/M. Goetz/A. Stephens, Reparations 
for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Systems in Place and 
Systems in the Making, 2009. 
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substantive claim while “remedy” is primarily understood to be a procedur-
al claim to legal protection, but the terminology is not consistent.26 
 
 
III. The Concept of Awards in Respect of Non-Pecuniary 
Damage under Art. 41 ECHR 
 
Art. 41 reads as follows: 
 
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the 
Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party con-
cerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, af-
ford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 
 
 
1. Rationale 
 
During the drafting history, the Court’s authority to “grant redress” (in 
form of just satisfaction) was perceived as underscoring the juridical quality 
of the proclaimed human rights: “therefore, this list of rights acquire a value 
which is not only moral and philosophical, but also legal”.27 
Although all violations of Convention rights engender immaterial harm 
simply by the fact of curtailing the victim’s liberty or equality in an unjusti-
fied way, the Court finds (sufficiently serious) non-pecuniary damage only 
in 
 
“situations where the applicant has suffered evident trauma, whether physical 
or psychological, pain and suffering, distress, anxiety, frustration, feelings of in-
justice or humiliation, prolonged uncertainty, disruption to life, or real loss of 
opportunity”.28 
 
The basic problem for any legal system or legal instrument foreseeing fi-
nancial payments for immaterial damage (bodily pain, mental anguish, loss 
of life time, etc.) is that such damage can never be truly compensated with 
material goods or money. Still, many legal systems allow or mandate courts 
to order payments. The question is most relevant in the framework of tort 
                                                        
26  Sometimes, “remedy” is split into a procedural and a substantive aspect (as in Principle 
11 of the GA Principles 2006 [note 25]). 
27  Consultative Assembly, plenary sitting of 14.8.1950, Italian Delegate, Doc. CDH(70)17, 
30.4.1970, 26. 
28  Varnava and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 
16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90, 16073/90 (ECtHR 18.9.2009), para. 224. 
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law. Here, the tortfeasor’s obligation to pay money for the non-pecuniary 
loss he caused is explained and justified by different rationales. The pay-
ment fulfills “an important function in providing solace” for the victim, “in 
affirming human dignity and in sanctioning inappropriate behavior”.29 Al-
though the tort law-functions, governing relationships between private in-
dividuals, cannot be simply transferred to the relationship between the state 
and persons harmed by state action, the basic rationale of the payment does 
seem to be similar. 
The purpose of awards on just satisfaction has been explained by the 
Court as follows: They 
 
“serve to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of 
a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the 
severity of the damage; they are not, nor should they be, intended to give finan-
cial comfort or sympathetic enrichment at the expense of the Contracting Party 
concerned”.30 
 
The special nature of Convention rights as individual rights is mirrored in 
the rationale for awards on non-pecuniary damage: These awards serve the 
interests of the aggrieved individuals. They are not intended to serve some 
collective interest, such as the public interest in punishing a wrongdoing 
state31 or in rendering respect for human rights more effective in general. 
The purely individual-focused rationale of the Court’s power to grant fi-
nancial “satisfaction” was clearly apparent in the Convention’s drafting 
stage. During that process, the projected Court’s power to award “satisfac-
tion” (“damages”, or “reparation”) was accepted by all sides. The point of 
controversy was rather the Court’s authority to annul domestic legal acts – 
which was ultimately rejected by the authors of the Convention. Exactly in 
the context of that bigger controversy, the purely individual-focused mone-
tary relief (as opposed to removing the root causes of violations by annul-
ling state acts) was criticized. The point of criticism was that “reparation in 
cash”, as the French delegate, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, called it, i.e. money 
                                                        
29  W. V. Horton Rogers, Commentary on Article 10:301, in: European Tort Law Principles 
(note 18), at 172. 
30  Varnava and Others v. Turkey (note 28), para. 224. 
31  See also Practice Directions (note 8), para. 9. Therefore, responsibility under Art. 41 is 
not about “punishing” the contracting state for a past wrong. “Fault” on the side of the state 
organs is not a necessary requirement for awarding just satisfaction, see F. Bydlinski, (note 2), 
para. 57. This is in line with the law on state responsibility which does not rely on “fault” 
either. The reason is that, generally speaking, the idea of “fault” is difficult to apply to legal (as 
opposed to natural) persons. 
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awarded to the grieved individual, might distract from the systemic prob-
lems in the state. Rhetorically, Teitgen asked: 
 
“But can the graver form of violation which consists in removing a fundamen-
tal law guaranteeing a specific freedom or the whole nation, […] can such a viola-
tion be redressed by awarding a symbolic farthing damages to the citizens of the 
country?”32 
 
It is (only) that “symbolic farthing” which has been retained by the 
drafters. So the primary aim of awards on non-pecuniary damage under the 
Convention is to “compensate” the individual for the immaterial harm suf-
fered.33 In this regard, any notion of “full” compensation for non-material 
harm would be misplaced anyway. But monetary compensation for non-
material harm – although imperfect – seems an acceptable form of justice 
instead of a hypothetical ideal form of justice. 
In addition to the compensatory motivation behind non-pecuniary dam-
age awards, in some jurisdictions, the rationale of granting money in re-
sponse to non-pecuniary damage is that such money will allow victims to 
enjoy life (again) after the trauma, by permitting them to buy goods which 
help them to do so.34 This non-compensatory rationale may also be squared 
with the awards under Art. 41. It should, however, not be considered the 
main rationale, because it presupposes the capacity to sentience and self-
consciousness, e.g. the mental capacity to feeling enjoyment. This can be a 
problem precisely in cases involving the gravest violations of human rights, 
e.g. torture, depriving the victim of that capacity.35 
The Court does not require “any proof of the non-pecuniary damage he 
or she sustained”.36 Instead, the Court applies an “evidentiary criterion”, 
acting on the rebuttable presumption that the violation of the Convention 
right engendered non-pecuniary damage.37 The reason is that many forms 
                                                        
32  Consultative Assembly, plenary sitting, 14.8.1950, French Delegate, Doc. CDH(70)17, 
30.4.1970, at 27. 
33  O. Dörr, Entschädigung und Schadensersatz, in: R. Grote /T. Marauhn, Konkordanz-
kommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, 2nd ed. 2013, 2148 (2174). 
34  On this rationale of awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage see Munich RE, Com-
pensation for Pain and Suffering, 2012, 14; Art. 10:301 of the Principles of European Tort Law 
(note 18), with commentary by W. V. Horton Rogers at 171 et seq. 
35  For similar considerations relating to the rationale of awards in respect of non-
pecuniary damage in a tort context see Bundesgerichtshof VI ZR 201/91 (German Federal Ct. 
of Justice, BGHZ 120, 1, 13.10.1992). 
36  Gridin v. Russia, App. No. 4171/04 (ECtHR 1.6.2006), para. 20. Firstov v. Russia, App. 
No. 42119/04 (ECtHR 20.2.2014), para. 49 (holding that the “applicant cannot be required to 
furnish any proof of the non-pecuniary damage he has sustained”). 
37  Apicella v. Italy, App. No. 64890/01 (ECtHR 29.3.2006), para. 93 (“strong but rebutta-
ble presumption that excessively long proceedings will occasion non-pecuniary damage”). 
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of non-pecuniary damage are by their nature not amenable to proof.38 The 
rebuttable presumption on non-pecuniary damage apparently applies no 
matter which Convention right has been violated. The Court bases its as-
sumption on the consideration that an average person in the situation of the 
applicant would in fact suffer such damage.39 Furthermore, while the appli-
cant “is invited to specify a sum which in their view would be equitable” as 
a compensation for non-pecuniary damage,40 the Court usually does not 
require the applicant to further describe, specify, or quantify his/her dam-
age. 
When the Court awards financial satisfaction, it is the respondent state’s 
international legal obligation to pay the sum within a time-limit set out in 
the Court’s judgment (usually, three months from the date on which the 
judgment becomes final and binding).41 Since 2001 the sum is normally 
specified in euros. 
Art. 41 does not require the Court to award “just satisfaction” in the 
form of money. In many cases in which a victim suffered non-pecuniary 
damage, the Court merely finds and states a human rights’ violation. It 
could be said that such a declaration in itself also constitutes some kind of 
“satisfaction” for any non-pecuniary damage suffered.42 Besides these two 
types of awards – merely declaring the violation, or (additionally) awarding 
money – the Court has so far not developed another kind of specific re-
sponse to non-pecuniary damage. For example, it rejected a claim – made 
under the head of non-pecuniary damage – that the “Government be in-
structed to disseminate the Court’s judgment in the instant case to all the 
law-enforcement authorities, highlighting the right guaranteed by Article 9 
of the Convention”.43 However, the recent practice of requesting the non-
compliant State party to take individual or general measures of course also 
responds to non-pecuniary damage.44 
                                                        
38  See Peck v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44647/98 (ECtHR 28.1.2013), para. 118 (refer-
ring to “emotional distress”). 
39  F. Bydlinski (note 2), para. 190. 
40  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 15. 
41  Practice Directions (note 8), paras. 23 et seq. 
42  See on the purely “declaratory” awards in cases where non-pecuniary damage has oc-
curred: O. Ichim (note 3), 135 et seq. See also M. Józon, Satisfaction by Finding a Violation, 
in: A. Fenyves/E. Karner/H. Koziol/E. Steiner (note 2), 741 et seq. 
43  Begheluri and Others v. Georgia, App. No. 28490/02 (ECtHR 7.10.2014), paras. 183 et 
seq. 
44  In exceptional cases, the Court has ordered individualized measures concerning the im-
plementation of the judgment, e.g. it orders the applicant’s release from unlawful detention 
(see Assanidze v. Georgia, App. No. 71503/01, ECtHR 8.4.2004). Second, the Court may have 
recourse to the “pilot-judgment procedure” and order general measures to be taken by the 
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2. Legal Requirements for Art. 41-Awards 
 
Six requirements must be met before the Court may award “just satisfac-
tion” under Art. 41. 
 
(1) The Court must have determined that a right contained in the Convention 
or a Protocol was violated. In cases of inadmissibility or when the application is 
struck out of the list, just satisfaction cannot be awarded.45 
(2) The domestic law of the involved state must not allow for a full “repara-
tion” to be made for the human rights violation (see the wording of Art. 41). This 
requirement is a manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity which governs the 
Court’s action, also when responding to non-pecuniary damage. It has so far not 
been further elaborated in the case-law. 
(3) Under the Rules of the Court, “[a]n applicant who wishes to obtain an 
award of just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention in the event of the 
Court finding a violation of his or her Convention rights must make a specific 
claim to that effect” (Rule 60(1)).46 In the absence of a specific claim for just sat-
isfaction (within the appropriate time), the Court usually refuses to issue an 
award ex officio.47 Only in exceptional cases, the Court has granted just satisfac-
tion even in the absence of a specific claim, especially when a right with an abso-
lute character (Art. 3, prohibition of torture) was concerned.48 
(4) There must be a causal link between the human rights violation and the 
non-pecuniary damage.49 No monetary satisfaction will be granted if non-
pecuniary damage for which satisfaction is sought is unrelated to the violation of 
the Convention.50 The Court often uses the standard formulation that “it accepts 
                                                                                                                                  
respondent state in situations of systemic malfunctioning of state institutions, see Broniowski 
v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96, 22.4.2004, para. 188 et seq. On these extensions see A. Peters/T. 
Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 2nd ed. 2012, 288 et seq. 
45  Mirosław Garlicki v. Poland, App. No. 36921/07 (ECtHR 14.6.2011), para. 154. 
46  Rule 60(1) of the Rules of Court, at <http://www.echr.coe.int> (entry into force: 
1.7.2014). 
47  Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00 (ECtHR 31.1.2006), paras. 59 et seq.: “Ac-
cording to its settled case-law the Court does not make any award by way of just satisfaction 
where quantified claims and the relevant documentation have not been submitted within the 
time-limit fixed for that purpose by Rule 60 § 1 of the Rules of Court. In these circumstances, 
the Court considers that the applicant has failed to comply with his obligations under Rule 
60. As no valid claim for just satisfaction has been submitted, the Court considers that no 
award should be made in this respect.” 
48  Borodin v. Russia, App. No. 41867/04 (ECtHR 6.11.2014), para. 166. For a critique of 
this approach by the Court see O. Ichim (note 3), 123 (violation of the principle of ne ultra 
petita). 
49  Shesti Mai Engineering OOD and Others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 17854/04 (ECtHR 
20.9.2011) para. 114. On causality in the ECHR context see the detailed account by F. Bydlin-
ski (note 2), 29, 72 et seq. 
50  Practice Directions (note 8), paras. 7 et seq. 
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that the applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the 
violations found.”51 For example, if someone imprisoned under circumstances 
constituting inhuman or degrading treatment dies because of a brain anoerism, 
non-pecuniary damage cannot be claimed for an Art. 2-violation (right to life), 
but potentially only for an Art. 3-violation (inhuman or degrading treatment). 
(5) The award of non-pecuniary damage must be “necessary” (Art. 41). The 
necessity-requirement makes clear that there is no right to non-pecuniary dam-
age under the Convention. In the terms of the Court’s Practice Directions, “the 
award of non-pecuniary damage is not an automatic consequence of a finding 
(…) that there has been a violation of a right.”52 
 
 
3. The “Injured Party” 
 
Under Art. 41, the person potentially receiving just satisfaction is the “in-
jured party”. This is a procedural notion. Generally speaking, the Court 
may not award just satisfaction to a third person who is not formally a par-
ty to the proceedings. The term “injured party” is synonymous with that of 
the “victim”. Being a “victim” is normally a procedural requirement for 
bringing an application; victims have standing (locus standi) in proceedings 
(Art. 34). Both concepts have been tied together even stronger by the entry 
into force of Protocol No. 14 which established the requirement of a “sig-
nificant disadvantage” as an additional admissibility condition.53 This means 
that (a sufficient level of) harm to a protected legal interest is relevant al-
ready at the admissibility stage. Its absence will lead to “incompatibility ra-
tione personae” (Art. 35(3) (b)). 
The notion of the “victim” (or, interchangeably, “injured party”) is cen-
tral for just satisfaction awards. It is unproblematic in cases of natural per-
sons. Even minors and persons lacking legal capacity can have the status of 
an “injured party”. They may choose to be represented before the Court by 
a guardian (although this is not mandatory).54 Beyond victims/injured par-
ties, the Court has extended locus standi to other persons in two situations: 
First, when the applicant dies during the proceedings, the Court allows the 
heirs, or even a third party, to pursue the application, provided that they 
show a “legitimate interest”.55 Second, the Court accepts applications by 
                                                        
51  Turek v. Slovakia, App. No. 57986/00 (ECtHR 14.2.2006), para. 121 (emphasis added). 
52  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 1. 
53  O. Ichim (note 3), 70 et seq. 
54  Zehentner v. Austria, App. No. 20082/02 (ECtHR 16.7.2009), para. 39. 
55  Janus v. Poland, App. No. 8713/03 (ECtHR 21.1.2009), para. 26; Malhous v. Czech Re-
public, App. No. 33071/96 (ECtHR 13.12.2000). 
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“indirect victims”: If the “injured party”’ (i.e. the person whose treatment 
by the state gave rise to the dispute before the Court) died before the appli-
cation was lodged, next-to-kin relatives may introduce an application con-
cerning the death or disappearance of the “injured party”.56 In the latter two 
cases, the Court issues its just satisfaction-award not to the “injured party”, 
but to the party who was allowed to pursue the application. 
The Court has awarded just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage to le-
gal persons, too.57 Certainly, the legal person itself cannot feel “anxiety” or 
“distress” which trigger such awards. But it arguably has an “individual 
substratum”.58 On that assumption, what matters is that non-pecuniary 
damage has been inflicted on the natural persons behind or mediated by the 
legal entity.59 The Court has itself justified such awards by pointing to the 
 
“company’s reputation, uncertainty in decision-planning, disruption in the 
management of the company (for which there is no precise method of calculating 
the consequences) and lastly, albeit to a lesser degree, the anxiety and inconve-
nience caused to the members of the management team”.60 
 
 
 
IV. Calculating the Award in Respect of Non-Pecuniary 
Damage 
 
How does the Court arrive at a particular amount awarded in respect of 
non-pecuniary damage? What are the factors which, according to the Court, 
play a role in the calculation? 
 
 
1. The Court’s “Equity” Principle 
 
According to the Court, the “guiding principle is equity, which above all 
involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and 
                                                        
56  Varnava and Others v. Turkey (note 28), para. 111. On the notion of “indirect victim” 
see T. Feldman, Indirect Victims, Direct Injury: Recognising Relatives as Victims Under the 
European Human Rights System, EHRLR 9 (2009), 50. 
57  Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal, App. No. 35382/97 (ECtHR 6.4.2000). 
58  See M. Emberland, Compensating Companies for Non-Pecuniary Damage: Cominger-
soll S.A. v. Portugal and the Ambivalent Expansion of the ECHR Scope, BYIL 74 (2003), 429 
et seq. 
59  M. Emberland (note 58), 429 (for references). 
60  Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal (note 57), para. 35; Microintelect OOD v. Bulgaria, App. 
No. 34129/03 (ECtHR 4.3.2014), para. 59 (emphasis added). 
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reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the posi-
tion of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. 
Its non-pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that moral 
damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and 
reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage”.61 According to 
the Court, the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage “involves flexibil-
ity and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all 
the circumstances of the case”.62 
The Court’s Practice Directions put it as follows: 
 
“Furthermore, the Court will only award such satisfaction as is considered to 
be ‘just’ (équitable in the French text) in the circumstances. Consequently, regard 
will be had to the particular features of each case. The Court may decide that for 
some heads of alleged prejudice the finding of violation constitutes in itself suffi-
cient just satisfaction, without there being any call to afford financial compensa-
tion. It may also find reasons of equity to award less than the value of the actual 
damage sustained or the costs and expenses actually incurred, or even not to 
make any award at all. If the existence of such damage is established, and if the 
Court considers that a monetary award is necessary, it will make an assessment 
on an equitable basis, having regard to the standards which emerge from its case-
law”.63 
 
How does the Court apply its equity-principle? The starting point is the 
sum claimed by the applicant which is, however, not binding for the 
Court.64 The Court will usually not exceed the claim made by the appli-
cant.65 Conversely, the claim is often not honored by the Court: For exam-
ple, in the case Konstantin Markin v. Russia, the applicant claimed 400,000 
euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage and the Court awarded 3,000 eu-
ros.66 Additionally, the Court may take into account domestic practice on 
the issue of non-pecuniary damage.67 Furthermore, multiple violations in a 
                                                        
61  Varnava and Others v. Turkey (note 28), para. 224 (emphases added). See also Cyprus v. 
Turkey, App. No. 25781/94 (ECtHR 12.5.2014), para. 56. On “equity” in general see F. Fran-
cioni, Equity in International Law, in: MPEPIL (2013). For equity in the context of the 
ECHR see O. Ichim (note 3), 43 et seq. 
62  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07 (ECtHR 7.7.2011), para. 
182. 
63  Practice Directions (note 8), paras. 1 and 4. 
64  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 15. 
65  See Mateescu v. Romania, App. No. 1944/10 (ECtHR 14.1.2014), para. 39: Here the 
Court – referring to the principle of ne ultra petita – awarded 1 Euro in respect of non-
pecuniary damage as claimed by the applicant. See C. Kissling/D. Kelliher (note 4), 587 (with 
reference to the case-law). 
66  Konstantin Markin v. Russia, App. No. 30078/06 (ECtHR 22.3.2012), paras. 165 et seq. 
67  Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal (note 57), para. 34. 
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single case seem to lead to increased amounts.68 “Punitive damages” are not 
part of the just satisfaction award under Art. 41.69 Finally, the Court’s as-
sessment of what is “just” in the concrete case is not amenable to proof, as 
the Court repeatedly held.70  
The basic consideration of equity is, as already mentioned, that the 
amount awarded should reflect “in the broadest of terms the severity of the 
damage”.71 How does the Court assess the degree of “severity” of the dam-
age? The case-law has spelt out three broad elements: the seriousness of the 
violation, applicant- and overall context-related factors. 
 
 
a) Seriousness of the Violation 
 
The first and most important element in the calculation of the award in 
respect of non-pecuniary damage is the seriousness of the violation.72 Ac-
cording to the literature, the seriousness of the violation depends on its in-
tensity, on the (particularly) serious consequences of the violation, and on 
its duration.73 
The intensity of the violation relates to the importance of the violated 
protected legal interest. Not all legal interests protected in the Convention 
are of identical importance. For example, a violation concerning the pro-
tected legal interest of “procedural justice” is – at least prima facie – of less 
intensity compared to that relating to the protected legal interest of “life, 
                                                        
68  See M. and C. v. Romania, App. No. 29032/04 (ECtHR 27.9.2011), para. 154. See also 
O. Ichim (note 3), 122. 
69  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 9 (“The Court has […], until now, considered it in-
appropriate to accept claims for damages with labels such as ‘punitive’, ‘aggravated’ or ‘exem-
plary’”). 
70  Korchagin v. Russia, App. No. 19798/04 (ECtHR 1.6.2006), para. 25: “The Court ob-
serves that non-pecuniary damage is the applicant’s subjective measure of the distress he had 
endured because of a violation of his rights and, by its nature, is not amenable to proof. Fur-
thermore, the applicant cannot be blamed for the authorities’ failure to update him on the 
progress of the enforcement proceedings. The Court accepts that he has suffered distress and 
frustration because of the State authorities’ failure to enforce the judgment in his favor within 
a reasonable time. Making its assessment on an equitable basis and taking into account the 
nature of the award as compensation for the unlawful criminal prosecution, the Court awards 
the applicant EUR 1,200 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be 
chargeable on that amount.” 
71  Al-Jedda v. UK, App. No. 27021/08 (ECtHR 7.7.2011), para. 114; Al-Skeini and Others 
v. UK (note 62), para. 182. 
72  See G. Dannemann, Schadensersatz bei Verletzung der Europäischen Menschenrechts-
konvention: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Haftung nach Art. 50 EMRK, 1993, 
398. 
73  O. Dörr (note 33), 2174. 
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physical and mental integrity”. Differences in the level of intensity can be 
explained by an implicit hierarchy of Convention rights, i.e. by ordering the 
rights according to their relative importance. The Convention itself does 
not explicitly establish such a hierarchy. However, the order of the rights in 
the Convention, starting with the right to life (Art. 2) and the prohibition of 
torture (Art. 3), may suggest their importance. In fact, the Court itself has 
referred to both Art. 2 and Art. 3 as the “most fundamental provisions” in 
the Convention and as “enshrining one of the basic values of the democratic 
societies making up the Council of Europe”.74Any violation of these rights 
will likely be considered as “serious”. Of course, one should note the limits 
of this argument: It can hardly be maintained that the prohibition of dis-
crimination (Art. 14), although mentioned last in the section on rights and 
freedoms, is the least important of the Convention rights. Furthermore, the 
fact that some rights have been made non-derogable even in times of a na-
tional emergency (Art. 15), or do not allow for any exception, such as the 
prohibition of torture (Art. 3) and the prohibition of slavery or servitude 
(Art. 4(1)),75 indicates that the authors of the Convention considered them 
to be particularly important. 
In addition, the consequences of the violation are itself a factor contrib-
uting to its seriousness. The Court uses several formulations to qualify the 
consequences as particularly “serious”, i.e. indicating exceptional harm 
caused by the violation.76 For example, the Court may state that the appli-
cant must have sustained “significant non-pecuniary damage”,77 or that the 
applicant “must have suffered considerably”78 or “suffered serious pain”.79 
Lastly, the duration of the violation has a bearing on its seriousness.80 Ex-
amples for such extended, and thus serious, violations are the extended un-
lawful deprivation of liberty,81 or extended delays in criminal proceedings in 
a rape case.82 However, obviously not all serious violations are of extended 
duration. 
 
 
                                                        
74  Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. UK, App. No. 61498/08 (ECtHR 2.3.2010), para. 118. 
75  See, e.g., Mocanu and Others v. Romania, App. No. 56489/00 (ECtHR 17.9.2014), pa-
ra. 315. 
76  See C. Kissling/D. Kelliher (note 4), 629. 
77  Mocanu and Others v. Romania (note 75), para. 371. 
78  Dimitrov and Others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 77938/11 (ECtHR 1.7.2014), para. 174 
(concerning violations of Art. 2 and Art. 3). 
79  Dimitrov and Others v. Bulgaria (note 78), para. 109 (concerning a violation of Art. 2). 
80  See O. Dörr (note 33), 2174. 
81  Storck v. Germany, App. No. 61603/00 (ECtHR 16.6.2005). 
82  N.D. v. Slovenia, App. No. 16605/09 (ECtHR 15.1.2015). 
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b) Applicant-Related Factors 
 
Second, the Court takes the “position of the applicant” into account 
when calculating the amount of just satisfaction for non-pecuniary dam-
age.83 What does the Court mean by this? In its jurisprudence, it has e.g. 
relied on the following applicant-related factors: the age of the applicant,84 
and the applicant’s “important judicial status” (as an acting or retired 
judge).85 Furthermore, the Court takes “contributory negligence” by the 
applicant into account and may reduce the amount of non-pecuniary dam-
age.86 Additionally, the moral conduct of the applicant matters. From a doc-
trinal point of view, it has been suggested that the moral conduct of the ap-
plicant should be taken into account by the Court for calculating the 
amount, but that it should not play a role when assessing whether or not the 
applicant is entitled to just satisfaction in the first place. The latter determi-
nation should follow “objective” criteria (such as the seriousness of the vio-
lation), unrelated to the applicant’s conduct.87 
 
 
c) Overall Context-Related Factor 
 
Finally, the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage de-
pends, according to the statements of the Court, on “the overall context in 
which the breach occurred”,88 i.e. the “local economic circumstances”.89 
The local economic circumstances relate to the respondent state. Respond-
ent states have different price levels, which the award in respect of non-
pecuniary damage accounts for. 
                                                        
83  Al-Skeini and Others v. UK (note 62), para. 182 (standard formulation). 
84  Kostovska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 44353/02 (ECtHR 
15.6.2006), para. 60. See also Z. and Others v. UK, App. No. 29392/95 (ECtHR 10.5.2001), 
para. 130 (“The children in this case suffered very serious abuse and neglect over a period of 
more than four years. ... The description of the conditions which they endured and the trau-
matic effects which this had on the children leave the Court with no doubt that a substantial 
award to reflect their pain and suffering is appropriate.”) See also Okkali v. Turkey, App. No. 
52067/99 (ECtHR 17.10.2006), para. 82. 
85  Zubko and Others v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 3955/04, 5622/04, 8538/04, 11418/04  
(ECtHR 26.4.2006), para. 74. 
86  Practice Directions (note 8), para. 2. 
87  O. Ichim (note 3), 124 (referring to C. Tomuschat). 
88  Al-Skeini and Others v. UK (note 62), para. 182 (standard formulation). 
89  Basarba OOD v. Bulgaria, App. No. 77660/01 (ECtHR 20.1.2011), para. 26. Practice 
Directions (note 8), para. 2. 
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At first sight this is not without problems. Why should torture in Ger-
many pay more than torture in Bulgaria? It has been demanded that the 
Court should award similar sums in these cases, irrespective of the victims’ 
country of residence.90 The argument is that identical sums are required by 
the principle of equal treatment which pervades human rights law. Also, the 
individual victim might move to a country with a higher price level after the 
Court’s decision. In that case the purchasing power of the sum of money 
awarded decreases unfairly.91 Both arguments should be rejected. First, the 
principle of equality does not demand identical, but appropriate treatment 
(suum quique). At this point the rationale for awards in respect of non-
pecuniary damage must be taken into account. The purpose of awards in 
respect of non-pecuniary damage is to (although imperfectly) compensate 
the individual for immaterial harm suffered taking into account the specifici-
ties of his or her situation. This necessarily context-specific determination of 
the award is a normative argument against identical treatment of individuals 
(irrespective of, e.g., their country of residence). 
From this perspective, it is fair that victims in Bulgaria receive a lower 
sum than victims in Germany. The constellation that a person might move 
from a country with a lower price level to a country with a higher price lev-
el is unforeseeable. We assume that this scenario is rare. Determining the 
sums with regard to the local economic circumstances in the current place 
of residence (independently of potential moves) satisfies the concern for le-
gal clarity, and again, guarantees equal treatment of victims currently resid-
ing in the same state. Extraordinary cases and speculations about the future 
place of residence should not govern the scheme of calculating just satisfac-
tion. 
Second, the policy of the Court properly takes the burden on the state in-
to account. As long as there is no pan-European fund from which the just 
satisfaction is paid (in the style of the reparation fund at the International 
Criminal Court [ICC], Art. 75 ICC-Statute), the economic capacities of the 
respondent state should indeed play a role. Under the Convention’s general 
clause on jurisdiction (Art. 1), territory and location matter, both for the 
Convention state’s primary obligation of conduct and for its secondary ob-
ligation to remedy and repair. The just satisfaction for non-pecuniary dam-
age concerns the relationship between the victim and the respondent state. 
                                                        
90  I. Cameron, Damages for Violations of ECHR Rights: The Swedish Example, in: N. 
Wahl/P. Cramér (eds.), Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol. I, 2006, 121: “There is state 
responsibility for this violation and as regards the measures of damages, the ECtHR, the 
guardian of pan-European values, naturally could not, and should not, say that a life in, e.g., 
Turkey is worth less than a life in, e.g., Sweden.” 
91  O. Ichim (note 3), 160. 
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It is this relationship which matters for the calculation of the award in re-
spect of non-pecuniary damage. Based on these considerations, the Court’s 
practice of differentiated sums seems justified. 
 
 
2. Limited Standardization 
 
Precedent standardizes the awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage to 
a limited extent.92 Although Anglo-American stare decisis does not govern 
the jurisprudence of the Court, the ECtHR takes its prior case-law into 
consideration when calculating the amount.93 The Court has started to set 
up tables or scales on past awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage, stat-
ing average sums, grouped on the basis of respondent states and violated 
rights.94 Good reasons militate in favor of making the tables public. For ex-
ample, publication would strengthen institutional legitimacy by increasing 
the public’s trust in the Court’s jurisprudence, would forestall excessive de-
mands, would create legal certainty, and would enable a more constructive 
public and academic debate on the topic of just satisfaction-awards.95 Nev-
ertheless, the Court has not yet published any table. Still, the apparent reli-
ance of the Court on such (secret) tables is a step ensuring the consistency 
of its just-satisfaction awards. 
 
 
V. Data 
 
1. Sample Selection 
 
Data is drawn from the online HUDOC database, which provides access 
to the case-law of the ECtHR.96 We created an initial database by selecting 
all judgments on the merits which were decided by the Court in 2006. In 
cases in which the Court deferred the decision on just satisfaction,97 we re-
                                                        
92  See also C. Kissling/D. Kelliher (note 4), 623. 
93  See Kakamoukas and Others v. Greece, App. No. 38311/02 (ECtHR 15.2.2008), para. 
45. See also Practice Directions (note 8), para. 14 (The Court will make an “assessment on an 
equitable basis, having regard to the standards which emerge from its case-law”.). 
94  See O. Ichim (note 3), 121 (with further references); N. Wenzel, Art. 41, in: U. Karpen-
stein/F. C. Mayer (eds.), EMRK: Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grund-
freiheiten, 2012, 573 (581). 
95  For further reasons see O. Ichim (note 3), 160 et seq. 
96  At <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>. 
97  When the question is not ready for decision, Rule 75(1) of the Rules of Court. 
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joined the two judgments (the one on the merits and the later judgment on 
just satisfaction). We selected judgments (thereby excluding decisions on 
admissibility) because only judgments may contain an award of just satis-
faction. The year 2006 was chosen for two reasons. First, the award relating 
to non-pecuniary damage is denoted in euros (as opposed to awards up to 
the year 2001). Second, we took into account that the phase of the supervi-
sion of the execution of judgments by the Committee of Ministers can take 
up to ten years. Choosing the year 2006 has the advantage that an analysis 
of compliance with exactly these judgments can be undertaken in a subse-
quent study. Cases which have been struck out of the Court’s list and cases 
in which the Court did not find a violation of a Convention right were not 
selected for the initial database. This initial database contains 1,425 cases.  
We then applied a number of restrictions to arrive at our working sam-
ple.98 First, we excluded cases where no claim for just satisfaction was made. 
Second, cases were dropped if the amount awarded in respect of non-
pecuniary damage could not be calculated accurately. Two types of cases 
had to be dropped because of the latter restriction: (a) cases where the 
Court awarded a “global sum” in respect of non-pecuniary and pecuniary 
damage and the non-pecuniary and pecuniary parts of this “global sum” 
could not be disaggregated,99 and (b) cases where the amount awarded in 
respect of non-pecuniary damage could not be allocated to the “injured par-
ty”. An important subgroup of (b) relates to cases where the Court found 
both a material and a procedural violation of Art. 2 (right to life). In these 
cases, the award made in respect of non-pecuniary damage pertaining to the 
“injured party” (concerning his or her death) could not be disentangled 
from that related to the procedural violation of the “indirect victim(s)”, e.g. 
the relatives complaining about the lack of an effective investigation by the 
state into the circumstances of the injured party’s death. 
Third, we excluded all cases with more than one holding on a violation. 
This allowed us to assess the association between the amount of just satis-
faction awarded and the violation of one particular protected legal interest 
(such as “physical liberty”). Fourth, we excluded all cases in which the 
Court rejected the claim for an award of non-pecuniary damage. Finally, we 
excluded the cases belonging to the protected legal interests of “non-
                                                        
98  In addition to the variables for the empirical analysis (see Section V. 3.), the following 
binary variables were coded for the purpose of sample selection/restriction: (1) a variable in-
dicating whether an award in respect of non-pecuniary was made; (2) a variable indicating 
whether the “injured party” passed away/disappeared due to the conduct attributable to the 
state; (3) a variable indicating whether the Court’s holding contained a finding on a violation 
of a substantive right in its procedural dimension. 
99  On the legal problems involved see C. Kissling/D. Kelliher (note 4), 585 et seq. 
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discrimination” and “ECHR procedure”, because the number of cases in 
these two categories was too small (only one case in each category) for a 
meaningful statistical analysis.100 Our final sample includes 543 cases. 
Importantly, our results apply only to the selected sample as defined by 
the restrictions above. Moreover, because the analysis is limited to ECtHR-
cases that were decided on the merits in 2006, our conclusions cannot be 
generalized to other courts and to years other than 2006. 
 
 
2. Unit of Analysis 
 
An empirical analysis of the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage 
by the Court can be potentially carried out on three levels: case level, appli-
cation level and individual victim level. We chose the victim level. 
In a case-based analysis, the unit of observation is the case itself. By 
“case” we mean the collection of facts on a particular series of events and 
relevant legal material, leading to a formal legal decision by the Court. A 
case may contain one application or more applications (if joined by the 
Court according to Rule 42 of the Rules of Court). A case may involve 
more than one judgment if, e.g., the Court decides separately on the admis-
sibility and merits (Art. 29(1)(2) ECHR), or if the Court decides separately 
on the merits and just satisfaction (according to Rule 75(1) of the Rules of 
Court).101 In our study, we have 543 cases. 
An application-based analysis focuses on the actual application, as identi-
fied by the application number given by the Court’s registry.102 In our da-
taset, several cases contain more than one application: the 543 cases corre-
spond to 587 applications. The number of applications exceeds the number 
of cases because the Court has the possibility to join several applications in 
one case if they are of a similar nature.103 Despite the fact that “similar” ap-
plications are joined in one case, some of the variables of interest in our 
study (e.g. the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage) may 
                                                        
100  The protected legal interest of “ECHR procedure” relates to the right to an effective 
application before the ECtHR. The Court locates this individual procedural right in Art. 34, 
see Gisayev v. Russia, App. No. 14811/04 (ECtHR 20.1.2011), para. 165. 
101  A case may involve one or more decisions of a formal legal type, i.e. admissibility deci-
sions and judgments. A case may be resolved by an admissibility decision if the application is 
declared inadmissible according to Art. 27 or Art. 28 ECHR. A case is resolved by a judgment 
if the Court, e.g., decides on the admissibility and the merits of the case together (Art. 29 
ECHR). For our analysis we only selected judgments. 
102  At <http://www.echr.coe.int> (visited 19.9.2014). 
103  Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. 
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differ within one case by application. For example, the Court decided to 
join several applications to form the case Kehaya and Others v. Bulgaria on 
the deprivation of property.104 While the Court found a violation of Art. 1 
Prot. No. 1 (right to property) in all applications, it awarded different 
amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage to the different applicants.105  
An individual victim level analysis (as chosen in this paper) focuses on 
the individual victim himself/herself. “Victim” is a technical term relating to 
the application procedure before the Court (Art. 34 ECHR). In order to be 
considered a victim, an individual applicant must show that he or she is di-
rectly affected by a measure which arguably led to a violation and which is 
allegedly attributable to the respondent state.106 He or she must also show 
that the violation has not yet been redressed by the state.107 In our dataset, 
the 543 cases correspond to 929 individual victims. The number of individu-
al victims may exceed the number of cases and applications for two reasons. 
First, as outlined above, the Court itself joins applications, thereby group-
ing individual victims. Second, the victims themselves may file a complaint 
jointly with the Court. It is important to re-emphasize that some of the var-
iables of interest in our study may differ within a case and in fact within one 
single application filed by several victims. For example, in the case Güzel 
Şahin and Others v. Turkey,108 only one application was introduced by five 
individuals who were awarded different sums in respect of non-pecuniary 
damage although each victim suffered the same rights’ violation. 
We choose the individual victim level for our analysis for two reasons. 
First, because the Court itself takes an individualized approach to Conven-
tion rights and considers the impact of an act attributable to a state party on 
the individual, the unit of analysis needs to be the individual victim. Second, 
as the examples above demonstrate, within-case and within-application var-
iation renders both a case-based and an application-based analysis problem-
atic. One could restrict the analysis to “clear cases”, i.e. those without any 
within-variation. However, this approach would introduce selection-bias 
and would unnecessarily reduce the sample size. 
 
 
                                                        
104  Kehaya and Others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 47797/99 and 6898/01 (note 104), para. 8. 
105  Kehaya and Others v. Bulgaria (just satisfaction), (ECtHR 12.01.2006), para. 29. 
106  Oleksy v. Poland, App. No. 1379/06 (ECtHR 16.7.2009); Burden v. UK, App. No. 
13378/05 (ECtHR 29.4.2008), para. 33. 
107  Sakhnovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 21272/03 (ECtHR 2.11.2010), para. 67. 
108  Güzel Şahin and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 68263/01 (ECtHR 21.12.2006). 
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3. Variables 
 
For the empirical analysis, we coded the amount awarded in respect of 
non-pecuniary damage and variables that correspond to the elements of the 
Court’s equity-principle (described in Section IV.1). Additional variables 
were coded to complement the analysis of the equity-principle. 
 
 
a) Amount Awarded in Respect of Non-Pecuniary Damage 
 
As mentioned above, we carry out the empirical analysis at the individual 
victim level. Therefore, it was important to code the amount awarded in re-
spect of non-pecuniary damage for each individual victim in our dataset. 
Clearly, this was not problematic in cases with one individual victim. In cas-
es with more than one individual victim the coding of the award at the indi-
vidual victim level was not problematic either if the Court specified the 
amount of non-pecuniary damage awarded for each individual victim sepa-
rately. However, the amount of non-pecuniary damage awarded was not 
always specified separately for each individual victim. In such cases we had 
to adjust the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage. There 
were two types of cases involving more than one individual victim which 
required adjustment. First, in some cases with more than one individual vic-
tim, the Court only specified a joint amount for all the individual victims 
rather than separate amounts for each victim individually. In these cases we 
had to divide this joint amount by the number of individual victims in order 
to arrive at the individual level. Second, in some other cases the Court speci-
fied an amount of non-pecuniary damage without stating explicitly whether 
the amount was awarded jointly or separately to the victims. In such cases, 
the Press Release issued by the Registry of the Court needed to be consult-
ed in order to find out how much was awarded to whom. 
 
 
b) Seriousness of the Violation 
 
The seriousness of the violation encompasses three factors, as explained 
above: “intensity of the violation”, “(particularly) serious consequences of 
the violation”, and the “duration of the violation”. 
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To capture the intensity of the violation two variables were coded: The 
Court’s holdings on violations of a Convention right,109 and health topics. 
We chose the protected legal interest-level (as opposed to, e.g., an article-
based approach) in order to ensure enough observations for a meaningful 
empirical analysis. We allocated the holdings to eight protected legal inter-
ests: “life, physical and mental integrity”, “physical liberty”, “procedural 
justice”, “private and family life”, “personal and political liberty”, “proper-
ty”, “non-discrimination” and “ECHR procedure”. These protected legal 
interests and the corresponding articles of the ECHR are shown in Table 4. 
These protected legal interests are assumed to capture different levels of vio-
lation-intensity: For example, we assume that violations relating to “life, 
physical and mental integrity” are the most intense type of violation, be-
cause they encompass, e.g., the right to life (Art. 2) and prohibition of tor-
ture (Art. 3). As mentioned above, the cases belonging to the protected legal 
interests “non-discrimination” and “ECHR procedure” were excluded 
from the analysis due to limited case numbers. 
For a comprehensive coverage of the protected legal interest concerning 
“life, physical and mental integrity”, further analysis of the data was re-
quired. We identified all “health cases”, i.e. those cases in which the victim’s 
physical or mental integrity were negatively affected by conduct attributa-
ble to the state. For example, a health case arises if a person is tortured in 
police custody or is treated inadequately in a state hospital. The health cases 
were identified based on 29 health topics (described in Table 2), using the 
health topics list of the World Health Organization (WHO).110 However, 
given the special features of an international (regional) court (which has ju-
risdiction only for acts and omissions attributable to a state), as well as the 
particular focus of the ECHR (which does not guarantee a “right to health” 
in itself), we had to split up the WHO health topic of “violence” into fur-
ther sub-categories. A first sub-category is that of “execution/killing or cre-
ation/maintaining of a life-threatening situation by the state”, the second is 
“torture or inhuman/degrading treatment while in police custody”, and the 
third sub-category is “violation of bodily integrity”. 
In order to capture the (particularly) serious consequences of the viola-
tion of the Convention, a binary variable was coded based on the explicit 
wording of the Court’s judgment. However, the number of cases involving 
an explicit finding on the seriousness of the violation was very small, less 
than one percent of the selected sample. The main reason for this low pro-
                                                        
109  There may be several different holdings regarding one article. For example, the hold-
ing is different if Art. 5(1) or Art. 5(3) is violated. 
110  World Health Organization (WHO), at <http://www.who.int.>. 
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portion is that we restricted our analysis to cases with one violation, and 
these contain fewer instances of serious consequences than cases with mul-
tiple violations. Because of the small case number, we finally did not include 
this variable in the analysis. 
We did not code “duration of the violation” because it is not always stat-
ed in the judgment and because not all serious violations are of extended 
duration. 
 
 
c) Applicant-Related Factors 
 
We coded a number of applicant-related factors not included in the equi-
ty-principle: victim type, sex, and various variables indicating the nationali-
ty of the applicant. We coded victim type because one legal person may 
comprise numerous natural persons which in turn may lead to higher 
awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Sex and variables indicating the 
nationality of the applicant were coded mainly in order to test the assump-
tion that these factors are not associated with the award made in respect of 
non-pecuniary damage. For the empirical analysis, a binary variable was 
generated, based on the nationality of the individual, equal to one if the in-
dividual was a national of the respondent state and zero otherwise. In the 
ten cases in which the nationality was missing in the data, we used the fol-
lowing procedure: (a) nationality was replaced by the victim’s place of birth, 
and (b) if the place of birth was missing as well, then the victim’s current 
place of residence was used. 
Applicant-related factors included in the equity-principle, namely the 
“age of the applicant”, “important judicial status”, and “conduct”, could 
not be analyzed for different reasons. We excluded “age” due to the large 
number of missings: A valid birth date could not be identified for around 
17  % of the selected sample and subsequently it was impossible to calculate 
the age of the applicant at the time of the violation or at the time of the 
Court’s decision for around one fifth of the sample. Our dataset only con-
tained one case with “important judicial status”, clearly not enough for an 
empirical analysis. The applicant’s “conduct” was not coded because, even if 
reported, this applicant-related factor requires substantial qualitative analy-
sis which is subject to coding errors. 
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d) Overall Context-Related Factor 
 
The respondent state was coded as an overall context-related factor. For 
the empirical analysis, we allocated the respondent states to three groups. 
First, we distinguished between “old” and “new” member states by year of 
accession to the Council of Europe. “Old” members of the Council of Eu-
rope are those with an accession date between 1949 and 1989, “new” mem-
bers acceded between 1990 and 2003 (after 2003, no new accessions oc-
curred). The distinction between “old” and “new” members corresponds to 
the differences in price levels across member states. Old member states had 
a higher price level in 2006 compared to the new member states, with the 
exception of Turkey.111 This is important because we assume, in line with 
the equity-principle, that in countries with a lower price level a smaller 
amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage will be awarded for violations. 
Our third group is Turkey. We decided to treat Turkey as a separate 
group for three reasons. First, and most importantly, Turkey is an outlier in 
the group of old member states in terms of price level: In 2006, the price 
level in Turkey was lower than in the other old member states and not con-
sistently higher than that in the new member states. Second, Turkey is an 
outlier in the group of old member states with regard to respect for rule of 
law and democracy. Its low scores on indicators measuring rule of law and 
democracy relative to the other old member states are documented by the 
World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index and the Economist Intelli-
gence Unit democracy Index.112 Third, an exceptionally large number of 
cases arise from Turkey (18 percent), allowing for separate grouping. 
The three groups and the corresponding countries in the full sample are 
listed in Table 3.113 The full sample contains 34 countries; 16 and 17 of these 
countries belong to the old and new member states, respectively. 
 
 
e) Court-Related Factor 
 
Finally, we captured one Court-related factor: type of opinion concern-
ing the holding (e.g. unanimous opinion). This Court-related factor is not 
                                                        
111  For detail on comparative price levels see at <http://www.ec.europa.eu>. 
112  For detail on the WJP Rule of Law Index and on the Economist Intelligence Unit de-
mocracy index 2006 see at <http://www.worldjusticeproject.org> and <http://www. 
economist.com>. 
113  By “full sample” we mean the full selected sample as defined by our sample re-
strictions (N=929). The “subsample of natural persons” refers to the natural persons within 
our full sample. 
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part of the equity-principle as outlined above. We include it as a control 
variable in one of our estimated models because we assume that there is an 
association between the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary dam-
age and the “complexity” of the cases, as indicated by the existence of a sep-
arate opinion concerning the holding(s). Therefore, four types of opinion 
were coded: unanimous, concurring, dissenting opinion, and both concur-
ring and dissenting opinions within a case. We then merged these four types 
of opinion for the empirical analysis to indicate the presence of a separate 
opinion as follows: unanimous versus at least one concurring and/or dis-
senting opinion. 
The coded variables are described and summarized in Tables 1 and 5, re-
spectively.114 
 
 
VI. Empirical Model and Estimation Results 
 
1. Empirical Model 
 
We use a multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between 
the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage and the three ele-
ments of the equity-principle, namely seriousness of the violation, overall 
context- and applicant-related factors. We define Model 1 (the “equity 
model”), our benchmark model, as follows: 
 
logሺߛ௜ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ଵܸ௜ ൅ ߚଶ ଶܸ௜ ൅ ߚଷ ଷܸ௜ ൅ ߚସ ସܸ௜ ൅ ߚହ ହܸ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ ଵܵ௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵଶ௜ ൅ ߚ଼ܮ௜ ൅ ߝ௜, 
݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊. 
 
The dependent variable, log(γi), is the natural logarithm of the amount 
awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage.115 The subscript ݅ indexes the 
individual victims in the selected sample of ݊ victims. A visual inspection of 
Figure 1 suggests that the distribution of the awards made in respect of non-
pecuniary damage in the full selected sample is right-skewed, with a small 
number of victims awarded high sums in respect of non-pecuniary dam-
age.116 We use the logarithmic transformation of the amount awarded in re-
spect of non-pecuniary damage in order to mitigate the right-skewedness of 
                                                        
114  The full list of coded variables is available upon request. 
115  See J. M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 5th ed. 2013, 
191 et seq., on logarithmic functional forms. 
116  Note that the distribution on non-pecuniary damage for the subsample of natural per-
sons is right-skewed as well. The figure is available on request. 
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the award distribution and because it allows for the interpretation of the 
parameter estimates in terms of percentage changes.117 
The key independent variables are the protected legal interests: “life, 
physical and mental integrity”, “physical liberty”, “procedural justice”, 
“private and family life”, “personal and political liberty” and “property”. 
For the analysis we select the most dominant category, namely “procedural 
justice”, as our reference category and define five dummy variables ( ௞ܸ௜, 
݇ ൌ 1,… , 5ሻ for each of the remaining categories. 
Further explanatory variables in Model 1 are those variables which we as-
sume to play a significant role in the award made in respect of non-
pecuniary damage: the grouped respondent states and victim type. In our 
analysis, we choose the new member states (the most dominant category) as 
the base category and define two dummy variables ( ଵܵ௜ and ܵଶ௜) for Turkey 
and the old member states. We assume, for reasons outlined above, that a 
higher amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage is awarded to victims in 
the old member states and in Turkey, ceteris paribus. We include a dummy 
variable for the victim type (Li), equal to one for legal persons and zero for 
natural persons. The inclusion of victim type is due to the fact that one legal 
person may comprise numerous natural persons, which in turn may influ-
ence the amount awarded. 
The coefficients to be estimated are the ߚs, and ߝ௜ is an error term. The ߚs 
are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Standard errors are clustered 
at the case level, because the judges tend to join similar applications into one 
case and individuals may file a joint application. Model 1 is estimated on the 
full sample. 
In additional models (Models 2 and 3), we extend the set of independent 
variables in Model 1. In Model 2 we account for a court-related factor, 
namely the presence of a separate opinion, by defining a dummy variable 
equal to one for unanimous opinions and zero for the presence of a separate 
opinion (concurring and/or dissenting). Model 2 is estimated on the full 
sample. In Model 3 we extend the set of independent variables in Model 1 to 
account for additional applicant-related factors, by including dummy varia-
bles for sex (equal to one if female and zero if male) and nationality (equal 
to one for non-nationals of the respondent state and zero for nationals of 
the respondent state). We fit Model 3 on the subsample of natural persons. 
For the subsample analysis we exclude observations with missing infor-
mation on sex and nationality. The missing values on sex and nationality 
coincide and amount to less than one percent of the subsample of natural 
                                                        
117  The logarithmic transformation makes the non-pecuniary damage distribution more 
normal. The results are available upon request. 
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persons. Note that we expect that neither sex nor nationality is associated 
with the amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage. Model 3 is estimated 
to test the latter assumptions. 
 
 
2. Estimation Results 
 
The OLS estimation results for our three models are reported in Table 
6.118 First, we summarize the results concerning the protected legal interests 
in Model 1, our “equity model”. The coefficient estimates on the five dum-
my variables for the protected legal interests measure the proportionate dif-
ference in awards made in respect of non-pecuniary damage relative to 
“procedural justice”, holding respondent state, and victim type constant. In 
Model 1, all of the coefficients are statistically significant, with the excep-
tion of “property”. Victims suffering violations concerning the protected 
legal interest of “life, physical and mental integrity” are awarded approxi-
mately 72 % more than victims suffering violations concerning “procedural 
justice” – which is the highest “premium”.119 Victims suffering violations 
concerning “private and family life” are also awarded a higher amount in 
respect of non-pecuniary damage relative to the reference category by 
around 41 %. Victims suffering violations concerning “physical liberty” and 
“personal and political liberty” are awarded a lower amount in respect of 
non-pecuniary damage relative to the reference category by approximately 
59 % and 47 %, respectively. 
The coefficient estimates of the context- and applicant-related variables in 
Model 1 are all statistically significant. Victims from Turkey and the remain-
                                                        
118  As a robustness check, we ran our preferred model (Model 1) as a robust regression. 
The robust regression confirmed the OLS results. Furthermore, we estimated Model 1 on two 
alternative, “conservative” samples. First, we estimated Model 1 on a sample where the final 
decision on the award of the amount granted in respect of non-pecuniary damage was made in 
2006 (N=851). Second, we estimated Model 1 on the sample where the protected legal interest 
of “physical liberty” did not contain the procedural aspects of the right to physical liberty, i.e. 
Art. 5(2)-(5) (N=920). The parameter estimates remained robust in both “conservative” sam-
ples. Furthermore, we estimated an alternative version of Model 2, whereby we included a 
further Court-related variable, a continuous variable indicating the time elapsed between the 
lodge date and the judgment date (measured in years). The estimated coefficient on this addi-
tional control variable was neither economically nor statistically significant and its inclusion 
did not affect the remaining coefficient estimates. Finally, we fitted Model 3 on the full sub-
sample of natural persons (N=911). The parameter estimates remained robust. The unreported 
estimation results are available upon request. 
119  Note that we refer to the “approximation” (i.e. 100	ݔ	ߚመ) when discussing the coeffi-
cient estimates and not to the exact percentage (i.e.	100	ݔ	ሾexp൫ߚመ൯ െ 1ሿ). 
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ing old member states are awarded around 39 % and 63 % more than those 
from new member states, respectively, ceteris paribus. Legal persons are 
awarded approximately 42 % more in respect of non-pecuniary damage, 
relative to natural persons, ceteris paribus. 
The estimated coefficients on the protected legal interests, respondent 
state groups and victim type are robust across Models 1-3. In Model 2, we 
extended the “equity model” with a variable capturing the presence of a 
separate opinion. The award in respect of non-pecuniary damage in cases 
with concurring and/or dissenting opinion is estimated to be lower by 
around 54 % relative to those with a unanimous opinion, holding protected 
legal interest, respondent state and victim type fixed. In Model 3, we ex-
panded the set of control variables to capture applicant-related characteris-
tics, and ran the OLS regression on the subsample of natural persons. The 
coefficient estimates on both sex and nationality dummies are statistically 
not significant. This implies that neither women nor non-nationals of a re-
spondent state are awarded a lower amount in respect of non-pecuniary 
damage than otherwise comparable men and nationals of the respondent 
states. 
 
 
VII. Discussion 
 
This Section discusses the estimation results in light of the Court’s equi-
ty-principle. Our empirical results show that there is a “pattern” in the 
awards made in respect of non-pecuniary damage by the Court. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss our findings for the protected legal interests and other 
factors in detail. 
 
 
1. Intensity of the Violation 
 
a) Life, Physical and Mental Integrity 
 
The protected legal interest of “life, physical and mental integrity” is cov-
ered and shaped by a number of Convention rights: the right to life (Art. 2), 
the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment/punishment 
(Art. 3), the prohibition of slavery and forced labor (Art. 4), and the aboli-
tion of the death penalty (Art. 1 Prot. 6). Violations of bodily or mental 
health that do not exceed the level of severity required for Art. 3 may be 
considered under the right to private life (Art. 8), under its head of “physi-
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 2016, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
 Measuring Violations of Human Rights 33 
ZaöRV 76 (2016) 
cal and psychological integrity of a person”.120 To argue a case under the 
physical and psychological integrity-head of Art. 8, the actual harm to the 
victim’s health and well-being must have reached a sufficient level.121 The 
cases in our selected sample concerned, e.g., the lack of an independent, ad-
equate or effective investigation into the death of a relative,122 weekly rou-
tine strip-searches of a prison inmate,123 ill-treatment while in police custo-
dy,124 inadequate conditions of detention,125 or harm due to environmental 
pollution.126 
The protected legal interest of “life, physical and mental integrity” is 
commonly considered to be of highest importance. It was therefore ex-
pected that the highest premium is awarded for harm done to this legal in-
terest. The results confirm our expectation. It should be noted, however, 
that the cases in the sub-sample of “life, physical and mental integrity” did 
not involve cases of death or disappearance of victims due to the sample re-
strictions that we made, thereby excluding some of the most severe cases. 
Given the assumption that the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary 
damage is higher in these cases, the estimates concerning the protected legal 
interest of “life, physical and mental integrity” in the present study may be 
downward biased. 
 
 
b) Private and Family Life 
 
The legal interest of “private and family life” is protected by a number of 
provisions of the Convention: Art. 8 (right to respect for private and family 
life), Art. 12 (right to marry), Art. 2 Prot. 1 (right to education, including 
the rights of parents in education), and Art. 2 Prot. 4 (freedom of move-
ment, choice of residence and freedom to leave the country), Art. 3 Prot. 4 
(prohibition of expulsion of nationals), Art. 4 Prot. 4 (prohibition of collec-
tive expulsion of aliens). The scope of the right to respect for private life 
(Art. 8) is very broad, and – according to the Court – “does not lend itself 
                                                        
120  Pretty v. UK, App. No. 2346/02 (ECtHR 29.4.2002), para. 61; Gillberg v. Sweden, 
App. No. 41723/06 (ECtHR 3.4.2012), para. 66. 
121  Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia, App. Nos. 53157/99, 53247/99, 56850/00, 53695/00 
(ECtHR 26.10.2006), para. 100. 
122  Sergey Shevchenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 32478/02 (ECtHR 4.4.2006). 
123  Sylla v. the Netherlands, App. No. 14683/03 (ECtHR 6.7.2006). 
124  Emirhan Yildiz and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 61898/00 (ECtHR 5.12.2006). 
125  Cenbauer v. Croatia, App. No. 73786/01 (ECtHR 9.3.2006); Kaja v. Greece, App. No. 
32927/03 (ECtHR 27.7.2006). 
126  Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia (note 121). 
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 2016, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
34 Altwicker-Hámori/Altwicker/Peters 
ZaöRV 76 (2016) 
to exhaustive definition”.127 This, in turn, leads to a broad spectrum of con-
stellations in which the Court applies Art. 8. Regarding “private life”, our 
sample contains, e.g., cases on the search of home and office,128 interferences 
with the right to correspondence of a prison inmate,129 or the dissemination 
of information concerning the applicant and a photograph of him in a 
newspaper and in decisions by domestic courts.130 Regarding “family life”, 
our sample contains, e.g., cases concerning inappropriate efforts by the state 
to ensure the applicant’s access to his child,131 and the authorities’ failure to 
reunite a father with his daughter.132 Our sample did not include cases con-
cerning the right to marry (Art. 12), but one case on the right to education 
(Art. 2 Prot. 1).133 The latter case concerned the annulment of the results of 
a candidate who had passed university admission exams.134 The sample con-
tained one case on the freedom of movement (Art. 2 Prot. 4), in which the 
authorities refused to issue a passport for travel.135 
Awards made in respect of non-pecuniary damage in cases concerning the 
protected legal interest of “private and family life” are considerably high, 
ranging second after “life, physical and mental integrity”. This can be ex-
plained by the close connection of this protected legal interest with the fun-
damental value of human dignity.136 
 
 
c) Procedural Justice 
 
The group of protected legal interest of “procedural justice” encompasses 
a number of Convention rights. The central provision on procedural justice 
in the Convention is the right to fair trial contained in Art. 6. It is supple-
                                                        
127  Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, App. No. 13178/03 (ECtHR 
12.10.2006), para. 83. 
128  Taner Kiliç v. Turkey, App. No. 70845/01 (ECtHR 24.10.2006). 
129  Kwiek v. Poland, App. No. 51895/99 (ECtHR 30.5.2006); Čiapas v. Lithuania, App. 
No. 4902/02 (ECtHR 16.11.2006); Fazıl Ahmet Tamer v. Turkey, App. No. 6289/02 (ECtHR 
5.12.2006). 
130  Gurgenidze v. Georgia, App. No. 71678/01 (ECtHR 17.10.2006). 
131  Lafargue v. Roumania, App. No. 37284/02 (13.7.2006). Similarly, Hunt v. Ukraine, 
App. No. 31111/04 (ECtHR 7.12.2006). 
132  Bajrami v. Albania, App. No. 35853/04 (ECtHR 12.12.2006). 
133  Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, App. No. 60856/00 (7.2.2006). 
134  Mürsel Eren v. Turkey (note 133). 
135  Bartik v. Russia, App. No. 55565/00 (ECtHR 21.12.2006). 
136  The Court has stated that “the very essence of the Convention is respect for human 
dignity and human freedom”, (V. C. v. Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, [ECtHR 8.11.2011], 
para. 105). On the connection between human freedom (understood as autonomy) and human 
dignity see from an ethical perspective, J. Griffin, On Human Rights, 2011, 151 et seq. 
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mented by procedural guarantees contained in other Convention norms: no 
punishment without law (Art. 7), the right to an effective remedy (Art. 13), 
Art. 1 Prot. 7 (procedural safeguards relating to the expulsion of aliens), 
Art. 2 Prot. 7 (the right of appeal in criminal matters), the right to compen-
sation for wrongful conviction (Art. 3 Prot. 7), and the right not to be tried 
or punished twice (Art. 4 Prot. 7). The cases in our sample concern, e.g., the 
length of proceedings (Art. 6(1)),137 the non-enforcement of a domestic 
Court judgment (Art. 6(1)),138 denial of effective access to an impartial tri-
bunal (Art. 6(1)),139 and the independence of the tribunal (Art. 6(1)).140 
In our sample, the cases belonging to the protected legal interest “proce-
dural justice” by far outnumbered cases falling under the other protected 
legal interests (see Table 5). The “procedural justice”-group was thus chosen 
as the reference group. 
It is worth noting that awards made in respect of non-pecuniary damage 
concerning violations of “procedural justice” are significantly higher than 
those relating to “personal and political liberty” or “physical liberty”. This 
finding is interesting because it seems counter-intuitive. An important rea-
son for this result may be connected to the fact that many of the cases under 
“procedural justice” relate to non-enforcement of domestic court judgments 
on pecuniary matters. If that domestic judgment relates to a pecuniary asset 
(e.g. recovery of unpaid salary) is not enforced, the case – though formally 
concerning only “procedural justice” – involves a material aspect, too.141 
The Court takes this material aspect into account when calculating the 
award in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The award increases propor-
tionate “to the period during which a binding and enforceable judgment 
remained unenforced”.142 This may account for the high awards in some 
cases. 
Though this cannot be verified, the Court may also have policy reasons: 
The relatively high amounts of the awards may have to do with the fact that 
“procedural justice” is an element of the state structure, which means that 
violations are sometimes indicative of systemic deficits, and the Court (in-
tuitively) uses just satisfaction to incite the respondent state to remedy these 
systemic problems. In other words, violations of the protected legal interest 
                                                        
137  For example, Kuvikas v. Lithuania, App. No. 21837/02 (ECtHR 27.6.2006); Simaskou 
v. Greece, App. No. 37270/02 (ECtHR 30.3.2006). 
138  Lisyanskiy v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 17899/02, 9719/02 (ECtHR 4.4.2006). 
139  Szwagrun-Baurycza v. Poland, App. No. 41187/02 (ECtHR 24.10.2006). 
140  Maszni v. Romania, App. No. 59892/00 (ECtHR 21.9.2006); Tsfayo v. the United 
Kingdom, App. No. 60860/00 (ECtHR 14.11.2006). 
141  See also O. Ichim (note 3), 131. 
142  Burdov v. Russia (No. 2), App. No. 33509/04 (ECtHR 15.1.2009), para. 154. 
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of “procedural justice” are particularly harmful to the idea of human rights 
in general because they involve domestic courts on which the (Strasbourg) 
Court must generally rely as “natural allies”. Seen in this light, deficits such 
as the partiality or the lack of independence of domestic courts constitute 
severe obstacles to the administration of justice. This fact may call for and 
justify that particularly high sums are awarded for non-pecuniary damage in 
the field of “procedural justice”. 
Such policy reasons would, however, run counter to the rationale of just 
satisfaction as explained above (see Section III.1). The overall damage done 
to the multilevel administration of justice is a public interest concern. We 
submit, in contrast, that the purpose of awards on just satisfaction is indi-
vidualistic, relating only to the victim’s specific immaterial loss. 
 
 
d) Property 
 
“Property” as a legal interest is protected in Art. 1 Prot. 1. The cases in 
our sample concern, e.g., the requisition of a house,143 and the unlawful oc-
cupation of land.144 
Octavian Ichim has asserted, with regard to the protected legal interest of 
property, that “the compensation for non-pecuniary damage [for property 
violations] is generally at the lowest level when compared with other viola-
tions”.145 Our results do not confirm this assertion: The award made in re-
spect of non-pecuniary damage concerning the protected legal interest of 
“property” is statistically not significantly lower than regarding “procedural 
justice”. The primary legal interest infringed in property cases is a financial 
(pecuniary) one. However, a financial satisfaction going beyond the material 
value of the property of course presupposes that an additional, non-material 
harm (for example, the disturbance of childhood memories) was caused by 
the interference with property. This type of non-material harm is arguably 
not substantially different from that involved in violations of “procedural 
justice”. This may account for the “equal rank” of both protected legal in-
terests. 
 
 
  
                                                        
143  Fleri Soler and Camilleri v. Malta, App. No. 35349/05 (ECtHR 9.9.2006). 
144  Trapani Lombardo and Others v. Italy, App. No. 25106/03 (ECtHR 16.11.2006). 
145  O. Ichim (note 3), 134. 
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e) Personal and Political Liberty 
 
The protected legal interest of “personal and political liberty” relates to 
the following Convention rights: the protection of freedom of thought, 
conscience, Weltanschauung and religion (Art. 9), the freedom of expression 
(Art. 10), freedom of assembly and association (Art. 11), and, finally, the 
right to free elections (Art. 3 Prot. 1). The cases in our sample concern, e.g., 
the conviction for publishing an article in a newspaper (Art. 10),146 the con-
viction for participation in a press conference,147 and the refusal to grant the 
status as a legal entity to the Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army (Art. 11 
and Art. 9).148 
Infringements of the protected legal interests of personal and political 
liberty lead to reduced awards (in comparison to those concerning the pro-
tected legal interest of “procedural justice”). This finding can be interpreted 
as follows: Infringements of protected legal interests that relate to the indi-
vidual’s conduct in the social and political sphere appear to cause less non-
material harm to the individual than the infringement of procedural justice. 
The empirical results on non-pecuniary damage can be read as confirming 
that the Convention mechanism favors strictly individualized legal interests 
(such as physical integrity) over those legal interests that are more socially 
embedded (such as political liberties). The emphasis of strictly individual-
ized legal interests over socially embedded legal interests is in line with 
those philosophical accounts on human rights that focus on individual hu-
man agency and personhood.149 
 
 
f) Physical Liberty 
 
The protected legal interest of “physical liberty” relates to the following 
rights: right to liberty (Art. 5(1)), including the procedural guarantees in 
cases of deprivation of physical liberty (Art. 5(2)-(5)),150 and the prohibition 
                                                        
146  Klein v. Slovakia, App. No. 72208/01 (ECtHR 31.10.2006). 
147  Çetinkaya v. Turkey, App. No. 75569/01 (ECtHR 27.6.2006). 
148  Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, App. No. 72881/01 (ECtHR 
5.10.2006). 
149  See, e.g., J. Griffin (note 136), 250. 
150  An alternative would be to assign procedural guarantees contained in Art. 5(2)-(5) to 
the protected legal interest of “procedural justice”. We opined, however, that the connection 
with “physical liberty” is stronger than that with “procedural justice”, because the procedural 
guarantees in Art. 5 essentially safeguard the substantive protected legal interest of physical 
liberty (allowing a person to be deprived of his or her physical liberty only in a fair proce-
dure). 
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 2016, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
38 Altwicker-Hámori/Altwicker/Peters 
ZaöRV 76 (2016) 
of imprisonment for debt (Art. 1 Prot. 4). An example from our sample is a 
detention order without sufficient reasons (Art. 5(1)).151 The majority of 
cases in our sample relate to procedural aspects of Art. 5, such as excessive 
length of pre-trial detention (Art. 5(3)),152 or the right to have the lawful-
ness of detention decided speedily by a court or by an authorized law of-
ficer (Art. 5(3) and (4)).153 
The fact that infringements of the protected legal interest of “physical 
liberty” are associated with the lowest awards may be surprising at first 
sight. In general, one would assume that the non-material harm caused by 
illegal deprivation of physical liberty is substantial and should trigger high 
awards. An explanation for the lower amount of money granted in respect 
of non-pecuniary damage in these cases (relative to our reference category 
of “procedural justice”) could be the frequent occurrence of some kind of 
misconduct by the applicant causally related to the gravity of the violation. 
For example, a person whose (procedural) rights were violated in the legal 
proceedings but who had attracted reasonable suspicion of having commit-
ted a serious crime was awarded a low sum of just satisfaction.154 The ra-
tionale behind low awards made in respect of non-pecuniary damage in cas-
es involving illegal acts by the applicant corresponds to a non-technical no-
tion of “contributory fault” on the side of the applicant which triggered a 
prima facie lawful and proper law enforcement action.155 In line with our 
explanation, Alastair Mowbray asserted that the Court makes “moral judg-
                                                        
151  Ambruszkiewicz v. Poland, App. No. 38797/03 (ECtHR 4.5.2006). 
152  Harazin v. Poland, App. No. 38227/02 (ECtHR 10.1.2006). 
153  Fuchser v. Switzerland, App. No. 55894/00 (ECtHR 13.7.2006). 
154  F. Bydlinski (note 2), 29, 97 (referring to Doran v. Ireland, App. No. 50389/99 (ECtHR 
31.7.2003)). 
155  See, e.g., A. and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05 (ECtHR 19.2.2009) – 
concerning a (disproportionate) derogation order under Art. 15 – where the Court held: “The 
decision whether to award monetary compensation in this case and, if so, the amount of any 
such award, must take into account a number of factors. The applicants were detained for 
long periods, in breach of Article 5 § 1, and the Court has, in the past, awarded large sums in 
just satisfaction in respect of unlawful detention (...). The present case is, however, very differ-
ent. In the aftermath of the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States of America of 11 September 
2001, in a situation which the domestic courts and this Court have accepted was a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, the Government were under an obligation to 
protect the population of the United Kingdom from terrorist violence. The detention scheme 
in Part 4 of the 2001 Act was devised in good faith, as an attempt to reconcile the need to pre-
vent the commission of acts of terrorism with the obligation under Article 3 of the Conven-
tion not to remove or deport any person to a country where he could face a real risk of ill-
treatment (…) All the applicants in respect of whom the Court has found a violation of Arti-
cle 5 § 1 became, immediately upon release in March 2005, the subject of control orders. It 
cannot therefore be assumed that, even if the violations in the present case had not occurred, 
the applicants would not have been subjected to some restriction on their liberty.” 
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ments about the nature of different types of applicants, such as convicted 
criminals and terrorists, when evaluating their claims for just satisfac-
tion”.156 
 
 
2. Applicant- and Overall Context-Related Factors 
 
In addition to the intensity of the violation, the applicant- and overall 
context-related factors are significantly associated with the award made in 
respect of non-pecuniary damage. First, concerning the applicant-related 
factors, legal persons are awarded a higher amount of money relative to 
natural persons. In line with the “substratum”-conception of legal persons 
(see Section III.3.); the higher “premium” can be accounted for by the fact 
that legal persons typically comprise a number of natural persons as the ul-
timately affected rights-holders. Therefore, it is also normatively justified 
that legal persons, on average, receive a higher amount of money in respect 
of non-pecuniary damage. Furthermore, as expected, the Court does not 
differentiate based on gender or nationality when making awards in respect 
of non-pecuniary damage. 
Second, regarding the overall context-related factor, our empirical find-
ings show that relative to new member states, Turkey and the old member 
states are awarded a “premium”. This is in line with the Court’s equity-
principle: The ranking reflects the economic circumstances (i.e. price level), 
and potentially the severity of the harm in cases concerning Turkey. 
 
 
3. Court Related-Factor 
 
Interestingly, in cases in which the Court did not reach a unanimous de-
cision, the victims are awarded a lower sum of just satisfaction. We explain 
this by interpreting the existence of a separate opinion as a marker for dis-
agreement inside the Court on points of law. This may be explained as fol-
lows: The existence of a separate opinion can be viewed as an indicator for 
the complexity of the case. In complex cases, we assume that the judge rap-
porteur recommends a reduced award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, 
in order to incite the other judges to join the majority. 
 
                                                        
156  A. Mowbray, The European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to Just Satisfaction, 
Public Law 1997, 647, 658 et seq.. For criticism, see G. Dannemann (note 72), 401. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
This study is the first to empirically examine the awards made in respect 
of non-pecuniary damage under Art. 41 ECHR. There are no published ta-
bles on how the Court calculates these awards. The statements in the litera-
ture merely represent “informed guesses” on how the Court arrives at spe-
cific sums. Our empirical results contradict the frequently voiced academic 
reproach that the Court’s practice is arbitrary or unprincipled.  
According to the Court, the central principle for the calculation of the 
amount is equity. The three elements of the equity-principle as mentioned 
by the Court itself (seriousness of the violation, applicant- and overall con-
text-related factors) were captured using data drawn from the HUDOC 
database. 
The estimation results, in line with the equity-principle, show that there 
is a “ranking” among the protected legal interests under the Convention. 
Non-pecuniary harm suffered in the context of an infringement of protect-
ed legal interests of “life, physical and mental integrity” is compensated 
with the highest amount of money relative to non-pecuniary damage suf-
fered in the context of “procedural justice”. This can be interpreted as a 
“premium” paid for health-related violations. 
“Private and family life” is also ranked higher than “procedural justice”: 
Both first-ranking groups of legal interests are connected to human dignity 
and personal flourishment. Thus, non-pecuniary harm suffered in the con-
text of an infringement of protected legal interests with a strong connection 
to aspects of human dignity is compensated with the highest amount of 
money (relative to non-pecuniary damage suffered in the context of ”proce-
dural justice”). 
“Procedural justice” is ranked higher than “personal and political liberty” 
and “physical liberty”. This result is astonishing at first sight. It can be ex-
plained by the fact that – in cases relating to civil rights under Art. 6 – the 
Court takes into account material aspects (such as the length of time during 
which a domestic court judgment remained unenforced). These material as-
pects may lead to increased awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage.  
Awards concerning the protected legal interest of property are statistical-
ly not significantly lower than those regarding “procedural justice”. From a 
normative perspective, this seems adequate, given that the primary legal in-
terest infringed in the property cases is a financial (pecuniary) one. 
Non-pecuniary damage suffered for infringements of the protected legal 
interest of “physical liberty” attracts the lowest amounts of satisfaction (rel-
ative to “procedural justice”). An explanation for this practice might be that 
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the Court reduces awards on non-pecuniary damage in cases which arose 
out of otherwise lawful and proper law enforcement activities by domestic 
authorities. This practice is arguably consistent, although it risks disfavoring 
applicants who are suspected or convicted criminals. 
The empirical results show that the only statistically significant applicant-
related factor is whether the applicant is a legal person or a natural person. 
Gender and nationality are not associated with the amount awarded in re-
spect of non-pecuniary damage: We found that neither women nor non-
nationals of a respondent state are awarded a lower amount in respect of 
non-pecuniary damage than otherwise comparable men and nationals of the 
respondent states. So no sexism or racism taints the Court’s practice in this 
field. 
Sums awarded are adapted to the price level in the respondent state. This 
means, bluntly put, that torture in Germany pays more than torture in Bul-
garia. Although this practice may appear frivolous from a pure and decon-
textualized dignity-perspective, it seems justified by the rationale of the fi-
nancial compensation for immaterial damage. Given the fact that the harm 
done can never be truly compensated by money, one of its purposes is to 
provide solace to the victim or – in case of death – to his or her family.157 
This will depend on the purchasing power of the sum of money granted to 
the victims and their kin. Last but not least, the awards must be paid by 
governments with dramatically different budgets. The international law 
principle of sovereign equality demands that the real burden on the states 
should be equal. So respect of this principle, too, suggests that attention 
should be paid to the state’s overall budget (which normally corresponds to 
the price level). 
A relevant Court-related factor is the disagreement inside the Court, pre-
sumably due to the complexity of the case. Cases in which the Court did 
not decide unanimously but in which a concurring and/or dissenting opin-
ion has been rendered besides the majority’s decision, are awarded less rela-
tive to comparable cases with a unanimous decision. An explanation might 
be that the judge rapporteur recommends a lower amount of non-pecuniary 
damage in order to curry favor with potentially dissenting colleagues. 
Our empirical analysis has certain limitations, due to our data selection, 
warranting further research. First, the cases examined in this study did not 
involve cases of death or disappearance of victims, and we thereby excluded 
some of the most severe health-related cases. In further research, we aim to 
analyze such severe health-related cases in order to provide a complete pic-
ture of the “health premium”. Furthermore, we aim to extend the present 
                                                        
157  See note 29-35 and accompanying text. 
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analysis to combinations of Court holdings finding a violation. Finally, we 
aim to analyze years other than 2006 in order to check the robustness of the 
results of the present study. 
Despite these limitations, our empirical analysis shows that there is a pat-
tern behind the Court’s awards made in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 
The pattern in turn can be explained by ethical considerations of human 
dignity and individualized conceptions of personhood. 
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Appendix A: Coding and Description of Variables 
Table 1: Coding scheme 
Variable  Description
Dependent variable 
Amount awarded in respect 
of non-pecuniary damage 
Denominated in eurosa 
Seriousness of the violation: Intensity
Holding on a violation of a 
Convention right  
Codes ranging from 1 to 119 for the violations 
or combinations of violations
Health topic Codes ranging from 1 to 29
Seriousness of the violation: (Particularly) serious consequences of the violation 
(Particularly) serious conse-
quences of the violation  
0 = no;  
1 = yes
Applicant-related factors 
Victim type 1 = natural person;  
2 = legal person;  
3 = Stateb
Sex 0 = male;  
1 = female
Nationality  Codes ranging from 1 to 49c
Place of birthd  Codes ranging from 1 to 49c
Current place of residencee Codes ranging from 1 to 49c 
Year of birth Year
Overall context-related factor 
Respondent state Codes ranging from 1 to 47 corresponding to 
the member states of the Council of Europe 
Court-related factor 
Type of opinion concerning 
the holding 
1 = unanimous decision concerning the holding; 
2 = (at least one) concurring opinion;  
3 = (at least one) dissenting opinion;  
4 = (at least one) concurring opinion and (at 
least one) dissenting opinion
aIn one case the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage was de-
nominated in Cypriot Pounds and was subsequently converted to euros; bNo 
inter-state complaint according to Art. 33 ECHR in raw data; cCountry codes 
correspond to the countries of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, 
48=former Yugoslavia and 49=“other countries”; dPlace of birth only coded if 
nationality missing; eCurrent place of residence only coded if place of birth 
missing. 
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Table 2: Description of the specific health topics 
ECHR Right ECHR 
Art. 
Health Topics Examples  Code 
Right to life 2 Execution/killing 
or life threatening 
situation by the 
State
 1a 
Emergencies Armed conflicts; dis-
asters; disease out-
breaks; bioterrorism 
2a 
Domestic vio-
lence158
 3a 
Freedom from 
torture and 
cruel, inhuman 
or degrading 
treatment or 
punishment
3 Torture while in 
police custody 
 4b 
Freedom from 
slavery or 
forced labor 
4 Household slavery; 
trafficking of 
women and chil-
dren
 5 
Right to liberty 
and security of 
the person  
5(1) Forced hospitaliza-
tion 
 6b 
Right to priva-
cy 
- right to bodi-
ly integrity 
- right to 
healthy envi-
ronment 
- occupational 
health 
8 (Violation of ) 
Bodily integrity 
Policeman hits de-
monstrator, and de-
monstrator suffers 
injuries 
7 
Adolescent health Depression stem-
ming from hostile 
social environment; 
violence; sexually 
transmitted infec-
tions; adolescent nu-
trition
8a 
                                                        
158  Also Arts. 2, 3, 14 (+ 2 or + 3), see Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02 (ECtHR 
9.6.2009). 
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ECHR Right ECHR 
Art. 
Health Topics Examples  Code 
Health services Health care; equip-
ment; staff; infor-
mation; access to 
medicines; access (to 
medical treatment) 
9a 
Clinical trials  Vulnerable popula-
tion; case control; 
ethics; informed con-
sent
10 
Health research Drug resistance; re-
search policy
11 
Health technology 
and health prod-
ucts 
Essential medicines; 
biomedical technol-
ogies; in-vitro-
fertilization; medical 
devices
12 
Health systems Health financing; 
health services 
(standard); health 
education (standard); 
medical education; 
health workforce
13 
Health legislation, 
health regulation
Health policies; so-
cial security
14 
Infectious diseases HIV/Aids; tubercu-
losis
15 
Chronic diseases Cancer; respiratory 
tract diseases
16 
Reproductive and 
sexual health 
Family planning; 
infertility; pregnan-
cy; maternal health; 
breastfeeding; sexu-
ality; sexually trans-
mitted infections; 
female genital muti-
lation
17b 
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ECHR Right ECHR 
Art. 
Health Topics Examples  Code 
Child health and 
development
Child abuse; custody 18 
Ageing Nursing facility care 19 
Environmental 
health 
Drinking water; 
sanitation; food safe-
ty; environmental 
pollution; climate 
change; electromag-
netic radiation
20b 
Tobacco/substance 
abuse
Prevention of addic-
tion 
21 
Occupational 
health
Workplace safety  22 
Mental health159 Treatment; institu-
tionalization
23 
Domestic vio-
lence160
 24 
Sex/gender161 25 
Freedom from 
discrimination 
14 + Ageing Age discrimination 26 
Domestic vio-
lence162 (if gender 
based)
 27 
Sex/gender dis-
crimination163
Discrimination on 
basis of gender/sex  
28 
Disability 29 
aRelevant in raw data but not in selected sample; bRelevant in raw data and se-
lected sample. 
                                                        
159  Also Arts. 5(1). 
160  Also Arts. 2, 3, 14 (+ 2 or + 3), see Opuz v. Turkey (note 158). 
161  Also Art. 14 (+). 
162  Also Arts. 2, 3, 14 (+ 2 or + 3), see Opuz v. Turkey (note 158). 
163  Also Art. 8. 
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Table 3: Groups of respondent states for analysis (full sample) 
Group  Criteria Corresponding countries 
1 Old member states (ac-
cession 1949 – 1989) 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece,  
Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom 
2 New member states  
(accession 1990 – 2003) 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of  
Moldavia, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
The former Yugoslav Republic of  
Macedonia, Ukraine 
3 “Outlier” old member 
state 
Turkey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Protected legal interests and corresponding ECHR Article(s) 
Protected Legal Interest Corresponding ECHR Article(s) 
Life, physical and mental integrity Right to life (Art. 2), prohibition of tor-
ture and inhuman or degrading treat-
ment/punishment (Art. 3), prohibition of 
slavery and forced labor (Art. 4), abolition 
of the death penalty (Art. 1 Prot. 6), right 
to private life, under its head of “physical 
and psychological integrity of a person” 
(Art. 8) 
Physical liberty Right to liberty (Art. 5(1), procedural 
guarantees in cases of deprivation of per-
sonal liberty (Art. 5(2)-(5)), prohibition of 
imprisonment for debt (Art. 1 Prot. 4) 
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Protected Legal Interest Corresponding ECHR Article(s) 
Private and family life Right to respect for private and family life 
(Art. 8), right to marry (Art. 12), right to 
education (Art. 2 Prot. 1), freedom of 
movement, choice of residence and free-
dom to leave the country (Art. 2 Prot. 4), 
prohibition of expulsion of nationals (Art. 
3 Prot. 4), prohibition of collective expul-
sion of aliens (Art. 4 Prot. 4) 
Personal and political liberty Freedom of thought, conscience, Weltan-
schauung and religion (Art. 9), freedom of 
expression (Art. 10), freedom of assembly 
and association (Art. 11), right to free 
elections (Art. 3 Prot. 1) 
Property Right to property (Art. 1 Prot. 1) 
Procedural justice Right to fair trial contained (Art. 6), no 
punishment without law (Art. 7), the right 
to an effective remedy (Art. 13), proce-
dural safeguards relating to the expulsion 
of aliens (Art. 1 Prot. 7), right of appeal in 
criminal matters (Art. 2 Prot. 7), right to 
compensation for wrongful conviction 
(Art. 3 Prot. 7), right not to be tried or 
punished twice (Art. 4 Prot. 7) 
Non-discrimination 
 
Prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14), 
equality between spouses (Art. 5 Prot. 7), 
general prohibition of discrimination 
(Prot. 12) 
ECHR procedure Right to an effective individual applica-
tion (Art. 34) 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5: Summary statistics 
 Full sample Natural persons 
Amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage 4,053 (3,649) 4,021 (3,628) 
Protected interest: Life, physical and mental integrity 2.58 2.65 
Protected interest: Physical liberty 10.23 10.51 
Protected interest: Procedural justice 57.37 57.19 
Protected interest: Private and family life 2.80 2.88 
Protected interest: Personal and political liberty 3.34 2.65 
Protected interest: Property 23.68 24.12 
State: Turkey 18.19 17.26 
State: Old member states 36.49 36.73 
State: New member states 45.32 46.02 
Type of opinion: Unanimous 96.66 96.68 
Type of opinion: Presence of separate opinion 3.34 3.32 
Victim type: Natural person  98.06  
Victim type: Legal person 1.94  
Gender: Male  65.04 
Gender: Female  34.96 
Nationality: Non-national of respondent state  4.09 
Nationality: National of respondent state  95.91 
N 929 904 
Amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage: Mean is reported in euros, standard deviation 
in parentheses. All other variables are 0/1 variables, and the corresponding figures are reported as 
percentages. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary dam-
age (full sample) 
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Appendix C: Estimation Results 
Table 6: Estimation results (OLS regressions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Protected interest: Life, physical and mental integrity 0.72 0.73 0.71 
 (0.17)*** (0.17)*** (0.18)*** 
Protected interest: Physical liberty -0.59 -0.58 -0.60 
 (0.15)*** (0.13)*** (0.15)*** 
Protected interest: Private and family life 0.41 0.43 0.37 
 (0.20)** (0.21)** (0.20)* 
Protected interest: Personal and political freedoms -0.47 -0.44 -0.49 
 (0.19)** (0.18)** (0.20)** 
Protected interest: Property -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
State: Turkey 0.39 0.48 0.40 
 (0.10)*** (0.12)*** (0.10)*** 
State: Old member states 0.63 0.62 0.64 
 (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** 
Victim type: Legal person 0.42 0.41  
 (0.21)** (0.22)*  
Type of opinion: Presence of separate opinion  -0.54  
  (0.23)**  
Sex: Female   -0.06 
   (0.06) 
Nationality: Non-national of respondent state   0.18 
   (0.20) 
Constant 7.32 7.48 7.76 
 (0.23)*** (0.27)*** (0.07)*** 
N 929 929 904 
*Significant at 10 %; **Significant at 5 %; ***Significant at 1 %. Standard errors, clustered at the 
case level, in parentheses. Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of non-pecuniary damage. Omit-
ted categories: Procedural rights, New member states, Unanimous opinion, Natural persons, Male, 
National of respondent state. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on full sample. Model 3 is estimated on 
the subsample of natural persons. 
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